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1. Performance criteria for comparing societies in change1 
 
Overview 
In the world division of labour Germany occupies a privileged place: This can 
be seen on the basis of the result, in summary by the standard of living, 
measured as average income. The privileged position in the standard of living 
can only be maintained if Germany still takes a high proportion of qualified 
labour in the world division of labour. In the long run it may only be distributed 
what has been produced before, production and distribution have to be 
considered in connection with each other. And both are rooted in the interests 
and values of society and in its institutions.  
Due to the peaceful revolution of 1989 Germany had the chance to reverse the 
division of a nation into two states as a result of World War II through a transfer 
of institutions. The embedding of entire Germany in a European and 
transatlantic coordination mechanism is, on the one hand, a favourable way to 
make the capacity useful for the overall development, but on the other hand to 
democratically limit it, too. 
The re-unification of Germany means a decline in the average standard of living 
from the perspective of the old Federal Republic and at the same time a material 
improvement for the newly-formed German states.  
These special conditions in Germany should not let us forget, however, that the 
discussion on competitiveness had already begun before 1989. But from that 
time period on the globalisation of trade and competition has experienced a new 
boost, since now the "Second World" was becoming a stronger competitor on 
the world market.  
As a counter-strategy to the globalisation of competition, regional trading blocs 
in Europe, North America, and East Asia have been initiated. The European 
single market, enlarged in 1993, has progressed furthest concerning integration. 
In this context, I hold the view that the competition is by far the most dynamic 
force behind social development. As already Bornschier (1996) has advocated, 
the competitiveness of states is embedded in their social structure and 
institutions, and some of the conditions and factors shall be elaborated on (see 
chapter 3). The education system as a whole can be seen as a pre-condition of 
innovation and competitivenes. The various countries also differ in the logic of 
their educational regimes. When measuring the innovative capacity of countries 
we distinguish between investments in research and development as input and 
its resulting output.  
                                                 
1
 The following article summarizes the most important results of the study "Holtmann, Dieter: Dieter Holtmann 
The wealth and welfare of nations in change. Prosperity versus environmental sustainability, Innovation versus 
social security, equality of participation versus womenfriendliness and migrant-friendliness, social integration 
versus autonomy in international comparison. Aachen 2017: Shaker Publishing Company ". The detailed tables 
with source information cannot be documented here for reasons of space. 
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My theoretical approach is to expand the "three worlds of welfare capitalism" by 
Esping-Andersen (1990) by the "familistic" model of welfare state protection at 
a rather low level, the group of post-socialist countries that are in a process of 
differentiation, and the productivist welfare regimes of East Asia that are eager 
to have success on the world market. The different welfare regimes are 
according to my model anchored in different political regimes and production 
regimes, with which different modernisation paths can be distinguished (see 
chapter 2). The social security systems in the status-preserving version of the 
Bismarck tradition and in the universalistic Beveridge tradition with a high level 
of security (as they have in Scandinavia) and a low level of security (as in the 
economically liberal countries) are analysed using the concept of welfare 
regimes according to Esping-Andersen (1990), which distinguishes three 
different logics of welfare production in the triangle of the state, market, and 
family. Within the Bismarck tradition I distinguish the versions with a high level 
of security (as in Germany and other continental European countries) and with a 
low one (as in the Southern European countries). Furthermore, I consider the 
group of post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe which are in a process of 
differentiation. As a sixth group of countries I examine the productivist welfare 
regime of East Asia which aims at the economic advancement through export 
success on the world market. In addition, as emerging markets all BRICS 
countries are considered due to their growing importance. 
The global financial crisis starting in 2008 and the euro crisis since 2011 are the 
current challenges for the development of prosperity and welfare in different 
countries and welfare regimes (see chapter 4): the bursting of the housing bubble 
in the US resulted in a worldwide credit and banking crisis due to the global 
marketing of the credit securitization. Most involved and therefore also 
particularly affected by the banking crisis were the United States, Great Britain, 
Iceland and Ireland. The credit crisis was followed by a major recession in 
which the growth model of the Baltic countries which was based on credits, 
financed in foreign currency, suffered the deepest crash. In the Great Recession 
export-oriented nations such as Germany also crashed heavily, however because 
of their strength in exports they recovered particularly fast with the global 
recovery, too. Because of the necessary bank bailouts due to the world financial 
crisis and the necessary stimulus programs due to the great recession the 
national debt strongly increased in many nations. Ireland, Iceland and finally 
Spain were especially affected by the large banking crises. Given the poor 
competitiveness of Greece and Portugal in the Great Recession they had to deal 
with deep economic crises. The disclosure of the amount of the Greek national 
debt was the starting point of the following crisis of the euro, which revealed 
some weaknesses in the design of the euro zone.  
Concerning social security I distinguish between the provision by investing in 
education and the follow-up care by social services (see chapter 5.1). In 
particular through investment in education one can improve the population’s 
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capability to autonomy in the sense of actually realising formally free choices 
(see chapter 5.2).  
The prosperity of a country (see chapter 6.1) may be pursued institutionally in 
different ways. It is one of the characteristic differences of societies, whether the 
gross inequality is kept low on the basis of community values such as in Japan, 
or a low net inequality is achieved by welfare state redistribution as in Sweden, 
or whether the economic dynamics are accomplished by an economic liberalism 
that accepts inequalities in the distribution, such as in the USA. Equality of 
participation in income and education will be discussed in chapter 6.4.  
The economic coping with the global financial crisis developed differently in the 
various countries and welfare regimes (see chapter 6.2): the familistic countries 
of Southern Europe have stagnated at best in the context of the world financial 
crisis and therefore stayed behind in the level of prosperity compared to the 
other countries, while the productivist East Asian countries, especially South 
Korea, as well as China belong to the economic winners in the context of the 
world financial crisis. 
The other side of prosperity, the environmental burden, as well as the 
regeneration efforts will be examined in chapter 6.3. 
The changes in production are not well understood without the changes in 
reproduction, since employment and private housekeeping are closely 
intertwined (see chapter 7). Since the division of labour in production and 
reproduction is highly structured by gender, gender relations play a major role in 
the range of variation of the different societies. Germany is in particular 
compared with the prototypes USA, Sweden and Japan: the United States are 
understood here as a prototype of individualistic and economically liberal 
modernisation; Sweden as a prototype of an individualist modernisation with the 
welfare state as safety net; Japan finally is here characterised as a prototype of 
conservative modernisation, while Germany ranks in this framework rather in a 
medium zone. The womenfriendliness of countries is compared on the basis of 
the participation in politics, labour market, and education system. 
In the population structure significant changes take place and simultaneously the 
forms of life are changing, One aspect of change are migration processes. 
Therefore, the migrant-friendliness of countries and welfare regimes is 
compared in the dimensions of openness towards migration and the participation 
of the migrants admitted (see chapter 8.1). Given the differentiation of life 
forms, the societies are compared in order to determine how well the social 
integration – into the labour market (“having”), in supporting networks 
(“loving”) and in the civil society (“being”) – succeeded (see chapter 8.2).  
In summary, the performance of the various societies and welfare regimes will 
be compared on the basis of the quality criteria, established in advance in 
chapter 1 (see chapter 9). 
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Concepts of welfare and quality of life 
Welfare includes, on the one hand, the individual quality of life, and on the other 
hand, the public infrastructure.  
While the individual quality of life was formerly conceived in the Swedish 
model of welfare research precisely in terms of resources, meanwhile a broader 
understanding has been proposed, see for example “Having, loving, being: An 
alternative to the Swedish model of welfare research” by Allardt (reprinted in 
Walnut/Sen 1993). A relevant accentuation was proposed by Sen, Nobel laureate 
in economics: You must have capabilities (competences and capacities), to 
actually realise opportunities of freedom of choice (see Sen 1993: Capability 
and Well-Being).  
In international comparisons, since Esping-Andersen 1990 the public welfare is 
mostly conceived, in emphasising the importance of institutional development 
paths, in the form of different welfare regimes that contain different welfare 
goals and levels of public assistance. As ideal types, a distinction is made 
between a encompassing social democratic-egalitarian Scandinavian welfare 
regime, a status-conserving continental welfare regime, and an economically 
liberal welfare regime with need-tested poor relief.  
For the international comparison of welfare and quality of life, the United 
Nations create an annual “Human Development Report”, in which all nations of 
the world are compared with respect to human resources, productivity, equality, 
sustainability, and capability. However, due to the multitude of nations 
observed, many subtle differentiations in the developed countries are not 
considered. 
To capture the subjective evaluation of welfare and quality of life, the concept of 
general life satisfaction and satisfaction with specific areas of life has been 
developed, which are collected with the help of the methods of empirical social 
research.  
 
On the issue of performance of welfare regimes  
How societies organise and institutionalise welfare, expresses its fundamental 
values about living together in a desirable way. To emphasise that societies 
follow certain sociopolitical programs for certain periods of time, in the 
following the concept of welfare regimes (see Esping-Andersen 1990) is used. 
In order to compare the performance of societies in terms of welfare, criteria of 
social welfare are developed on the basis of a discussion of  socio-philosophical 
"moral values" (see Goodin et al. 1999). In the following the performance of 43 
countries with respect to the selected criteria will be discussed. 
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Performance criteria for the comparison of living conditions 
Goodin et al. (1999) and Merkel (2001) have each worked out criteria by which 
they want to assess the performance of welfare regimes. Goodin et al. (1999) 
suggest six moral values without ranking, Merkel five criteria of distributive 
justice, the numbering expresses his priority (see Table 1-1). 
To illustrate potential goal conflicts, I have proposed four polarities in each case 
between two societally (or socially) desirable goals which are displayed in a star 
diagram (see Figure 1-1). The goals were all formulated positively, e. g. the 
antithesis to universalism is the recognition of particularities, which is why a 
simple equal treatment between groups with different preconditions is not 
appropriate. 
 
Table 1- 1: Moral values and criteria of social welfare  
Goodin et al. (1999): 6 moral values Merkel (2001): 5 goals of distributive 
justice 
 Promoting economic efficiency 4b) Activation through the welfare 
state 
 Reducing poverty 1) Preventing poverty 
 Promoting social equality 5) Reducing the income and wealth 
spread  
 Promoting social integration and 
avoiding social exclusion 
3) Inclusion in the labour market 
 Promoting social stability 4a) Social security by the welfare 
state 
 Promoting autonomy 2) Education and training 
 
That there are trade-offs, does not mean that it would be impossible to achieve 
the goals simultaneously. E. g. the amount of consumption is constantly creating 
a similar amount of garbage, but one can also develop strategies to reduce or 
avoid the environmental burdens or to work on it with the help of technology. 
 
Prosperity and growth as well as environmental sustainability 
Goodin et al. notice themselves that "economic efficiency" is rather "morally 
agnostic" (ibid.: 15). In its footnote 5 (26) they refer to "material well-being" as 
the actual welfare goal. Accordingly, we would start from the goal of the 
material well-being which is shortly measured by the economists as the gross 
national product per capita. We want to add the goal of economic growth 
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Freedom of choice and 
capabilities 
(Autonomy) 
(Risk: Egocentricity/ 
Atomisation) 
Equality of rights and 
participation 
(Universalism) 
(Risk: Neglect of 
particularities) 
Social security  
(Stability of material supply and 
precaution) 
(Risk: Lack of flexibility) 
Prosperity and growth (Risk: 
Environmental problems) Innovation 
(Dynamics) 
(Risk: Problems of 
orientation) 
Recognition of the 
particularities 
(Risk: Formation of 
hierarchies and 
discrimination) 
Social integration 
(Risk: Social exclusion 
of „the others“) 
Ecological sustainability  
(Risk: Stagnation) 
because the tension just consists between quantitative growth on the one hand 
and environmental sustainability on the other hand. 
 
Innovation and social security (Stability of material supply and precaution) 
Due to permanent new challenges, innovation is also an important criterion, 
since the relative wealth is based on the relative productivity compared to 
others. Therefore investments in research and development play a crucial role. 
While the aspect of innovation is missing in the discussions of Goodin et al. and 
Merkel, they refer to the opposite pole, the social stability. The social security 
systems provide a stabilisation of income in case of illness, unemployment, old 
age, etc.  
 
Figure 1-1: Socially desirable goals and criteria for welfare  
 
(Projection of eight moral values in a two-dimensional representation) 
Modell: Dieter Holtmann 
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Innovation and social security (Stability of material supply and precaution) 
Due to permanent new challenges, innovation is also an important criterion, 
since the relative wealth is based on the relative productivity compared to 
others. Therefore investments in research and development play a crucial role. 
While the aspect of innovation is missing in the discussions of Goodin et al. and 
Merkel, they refer to the opposite pole, the social stability. The social security 
systems provide a stabilisation of income in case of illness, unemployment, old 
age, etc.  
 
Recognition of particularities as well as equality of rights and participation 
Goodin et al. and also Merkel formulate the avoidance or reduction of poverty as 
an independent goal, which is on the other hand implicitly included in the goal 
of equality. Poverty is understood as relative poverty, namely relative to the 
average citizen. 
The antithesis to universalism of equal rights and participation is the recognition 
of the particularities, which is why a simple equality of treatment between 
groups with different preconditions is not appropriate. The recognition of the 
particularities is not addressed by these authors, but plays an important role in 
the current discussions about the recognition of different cultures, orientations 
and lifestyles. 
 
Social integration as well as freedom of choice and capabilities (autonomy) 
Goodin et al. define the boundaries of the kinship as those for which one has to 
take care of. The concept of support networks seems suitable because it resumes 
family, friends, neighbours, etc.  
Merkel considers the inclusion with respect to the labour market as an important 
means of social integration. Unemployment on the other hand affects self-
esteem and the ability to act. 
To the permanent integration into family networks one could view autonomy as 
an opposite pole. Freedom of choice can be better realised if one had the 
appropriate capabilities (Sen 1993) that would enable citizens to actually seize 
the opportunities of formal freedom of choice. 
Investments in human capital are central, since they enable individuals to better 
understand and deal with problems. This capacity to act has a preventive effect 
on potential hazards.  
I consider these eight goals all as remarkable. Given the multidimensional nature 
of the problems I would renounce a prioritisation between these goals, since 
decisions should be made in due consideration of the context. 
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In the following chapters, the performance of 43 countries and – in summary – 
the different welfare regimes with regard to these eight socially desirable goals 
or welfare criteria is examined empirically:  
 
Welfare regimes 
 
Social democratic:    Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark 
Conservative:  Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, France,   
  Luxembourg, Switzerland 
Economically liberal: USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, UK, Ireland 
Familistic:                   Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Malta, Cyprus    
Post-socialist:  Russia; Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Czech Republic, 
  Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; 
  Croatia, Serbia 
Productivist:  Japan, South Korea 
 
Special cases: 
Turkey: Turkey is of interest as a candidate of the EU, amongst others. Due to 
the lower socio-economic level of development, Turkey is examined as a special 
case. 
South Africa: South Africa as a growing emerging nation now counts as a part 
of the extended "BRICS" group. The residual welfare regime necessitates 
informal networks for social security (informal security regime). 
Brazil: Brazil has a residual welfare regime with a very large informal sector 
(hence informal security regime). 
China: China has the extraordinary combination of an ideologically communist 
government and a dynamic capitalist development. 
India: In India the social security systems contain many programs only partially 
implemented. There is a very large informal sector (hence informal security 
regime). 
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2. Different paths of modernisation (Political regimes, production 
regimes and welfare regimes) 
 
2.1 Modernisation as a point of reference for the comparison of social 
structures  
The functionalist interpretation of modernisation theory (Talcott Parsons and 
others) emphasised that for instance the education and training systems 
contribute to the integration of society and increase the efficiency and 
competitiveness and evaluates modernisation positively as progress. 
The approach with the emphasis on the ambivalence of modernity (e.g. Zygmunt 
Bauman 1992) elaborates the ambivalence or even polyvalence of 
modernisation- process and assumes that "barbarism" is possible even in the 
modern age (see also Miller / Soeffner 1996). 
Below, the term "modernisation" is meant without judgmental progress aspect: 
In the process of modernisation not only productive, but also the destructive 
forces can act "on a larger scale." Below I will formulate performance criteria 
generally more ambivalent: If one chooses e.g. growth as a progress indicator, 
one should look at the back side of environmental problems as a criterion too. 
Stefan Hradil (1996) has proposed the concept of modernisation as a benchmark 
for the analysis of social structures. Hradil distinguishes as ideal types pre-
modern agrarian society, the modern industrial society and the modern post-
industrial (knowledge and service) society and formulates for each core 
statements about observations, which would be expected from the perspective of 
a general theory of modernisation that he confronts in his analysis with the 
actual empirical observations. 
In my opinion it is a good approach, first to formulate the criteria according to 
which the probation – here of the modernisation theory – should be assessed. 
But I suggest to distinguish, building on Esping-Andersen's theory of the three 
worlds of welfare capitalism, different modernisation paths, and I want to 
complement the three development paths of Esping-Andersen by three further 
paths what I want to justify now. 
 
2.2 Political regimes, production regimes and welfare regimes 
Soskice has proposed to differentiate production regime, which should 
characterise the types of coordination of business (see e.g. B. Soskice 1999). 
The uncoordinated (in my formulation: economically liberal) market economies 
with the US as example contrasts with the coordinated, which Soskice 
subdivides into the nationally coordinated with negotiations between the tops of 
the employers' and workers' organisations with Sweden as an example and 
sectorally coordinated production regimes with Germany as an example, where 
the social partners negotiate at sector level. Another form of coordination can be 
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found in Japan, where a ministry is responsible for coordinating the basic 
technology policy of enterprise groups. I would differentiate, as a further 
production regime, the state socialist or state capitalist, in which the planned 
economy or market economy is organized by the ruling party. Kitschelt et al. 
(1999) already pointed out that typical production regimes correspond to 
specific party systems and certain types of class compromise. 
Using the class alliances approach, which e. g. is used by Esping-Andersen, I 
would suggest for these three structurings the following causal order: The paths 
of development of class alliances structure the development of the production 
regimes, and the development of political regimes and production regimes in 
turn structure the development of welfare regimes (see Table 2.1). The table is 
structured by the two polarities of guiding principles in the two diagonals. 
Economic freedom of enterprise versus security through state supply and 
autonomously acting individuals versus social security by belonging to the 
family or clan. 
Through a successful alliance with the middle classes the Social-Democracy 
won hegemonic influence in Sweden and reached, after the Second World War, 
the expansion of the universalistic welfare state with a high level of social 
security. 
In the immigration culture of the United States there were so many cultural 
cleavages that the trade union movement was not as strong to avert the 
hegemony of the bourgeois parties. With the individualistic attitude that 
everyone has to take its own responsibility to use the development opportunities, 
and trusting in the efficiency of the market, the welfare was conceived as a 
residual: Only after a strict means test welfare benefits should be granted. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany the Bismarckian social assurance system 
had laid the early foundation, that the social security systems preserve the status 
achieved in the employment system. After the Second World War the social 
market economy was expanded under Christian Democratic influence, which 
was complemented by social democratic influences. Since the employers' and 
workers' organisations were both strong, neither the employer nor the employee 
side could enforce a radical policy option, which is why more likely 
intermediate solutions prevail, in the occupational welfare regime e.g. an 
intermediate level of social protection. 
In the Japanese case the bourgeois parties dominated and developed a national 
co-ordination of enterprise groups by a corresponding ministry. Since the 
companies took already care for the social security of their core workforce, the 
state welfare remained residual. The additional safeguards must therefore be 
shouldered by the families.  
In Italy also clientelistic party networks are relevant, the coordination by the 
state was expanded after the Second World War. Again, the families are 
important as welfare providers. 
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Table 2.1  Political regimes, production regimes and welfare regimes 
 
 Universalist 
  public welfare 
Private welfare within the    
household or family budget 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In
di
vu
a
lis
tic
 
 Hegemonic social democratic 
parties 
 
Hegemonic bourgeois parties 
 
In
di
vu
a
lis
tic
 
National coordinated  
production regimes 
Uncoordinated (economically 
liberal) market economies 
Individualistic-egalitarian 
welfare regimes 
 
(Ex.: Sweden) 
Low labour protection, but 
competitive tertiary education 
system 
 
(Ex.: USA) 
   
 
Catholic, social democratic 
and economically liberal 
parties without hegemony 
Hegemonic bourgeois-national 
parties 
Sectorial coordinated 
production regimes 
Coordination of groups of 
companies 
Occupational status-
conserving welfare regimes, 
average social security 
(Ex.: Germany) 
Productivist welfare regimes 
with privatised welfare 
(private tertiary education 
system) 
(Ex .: Japan) 
 
Hegemonic bourgeois parties; 
Clientelism (networks) 
Patriarchal or authoritarian 
regimes 
National coordination level, 
but weak administration 
National coordination level 
 
Status-conserving residual 
welfare regimes 
(Ex.: Italy) 
Patriarchal welfare regimes 
 
(Ex.: Turkey) 
Hegemonic communist parties / 
hegemonic state 
 
From authoritarian regimes 
up to a lack of 
state monopoly of force 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Co
lle
ct
iv
ist
ic
 
 
National coordinated  
production regimes 
From steering the economy by 
dominant clans 
up to a lack of coordination 
(tribalism) 
Collective-egalitarian 
welfare regimes 
 
(Ex.: state socialism in Russia 
before 1991) 
(Ex.: state capitalism in Belarus) 
From clan power over 
informal security regimes up 
to insecurity regimes 
 
 Universalist 
  public welfare 
 
Private welfare within the 
household or family budget 
 
 
 
 
 
Co
lle
ct
iv
ist
ic
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In the countries where communist parties won hegemony (as in Russia, China, 
etc.), planned economies have been developed, in which the party leaderships 
put through egalitarian schemes. Meanwhile, different variants of a state-
dominated capitalism have been developed in Russia and China. 
Finally, theocratic regime (such as Saudi Arabia), where church and state are not 
segregated, make the antithesis of a model of autonomously acting individuals 
(such as in Sweden). Turkey is a society that is developing in the field of tension 
between modernisation, division of powers, separation of church and state etc. 
and theocratic tendencies. 
Below, the Federal Republic of Germany is empirically compared only with 
developed societies and with the BRICS countries 2.  
 
2.3 Six ideal types of welfare regimes  
As an extension of Esping-Andersen (1990) I distinguish six ideal types of 
welfare regimes. In addition to the social-democratic regime with prototype 
Sweden the economically liberal regime (Esping-Andersen: "liberal") with 
prototype United States and two variants of the (in the terminology of Esping-
Andersen) "conservative" regime are differentiated: The continental 
occupational regime retains the status of employment in the social insurances, 
e.g. is status-conserving, prototypes are the Federal Republic of Germany or 
Austria. In the familistic regime of Southern Europe, in addition to the status-
preserving aspects the family plays an even more important role as a safety net 
in view of the residual state safeguards (see Ferrera 1996, 2005). 
I want to extend the term "conservative" beyond the aspect of "status-
preserving" (Esping-Andersen), what in my opinion also solves some 
classification problems. Esping-Andersen argues with three "stratification 
dimensions": conservatism, liberalism, socialism. The Netherlands then have an 
affinity to "socialism" and Switzerland to "liberalism". On the other hand 
Esping-Andersen considers the triangle of welfare production through state, 
market and family. If one acknowledges to the gender roles the importance they 
deserve, then the employment of women in the Netherlands, where the 
merchants invented the housewife model, has in fact risen, but to a large extent 
as part-time work, women still take over the major part of care work in families. 
In this sense, the Netherlands belong to the conservative welfare regime of 
Continental Europe. Accordingly, Switzerland, which introduced women's 
suffrage in Europe the last, with its division of labour between the sexes can be 
assessed as part of the conservative welfare regime of Continental Europe. 
Esping-Andersen rightly claimes to overcome a one-dimensional approach to 
welfare research, but not because of the concept of "decommodification", which 
                                                 
2
  The less developed countries could be differentiated according to Gough and Wood (2004) in "Informal 
security regimes" (safety on the basis of personal relationships) and "Insecurity regimes" (uncertainty 
dominates). 
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as measure of the generosity of the welfare state is an improvement over the 
share of the GDP for social spending (the latter also depends on the scale of the 
problems) which e.g. could be observed after German reunifica-tion, but is still 
one-dimensional. But with the triangle of welfare production through state, 
market and family as well as with the three stratification dimensions Esping-
Andersen has introduced a fruitful multidimensional concept, which is 
expandable. To emphasize the explanatory power of the approach, I would 
increasingly use the concept of the welfare logics of the regimes. As to the 
regimes, it is by now appropriate in view of the further development of the 
discussion to distinguish (at least) six welfare regimes. 
While work in the social democratic regime shall be organised in solidarity and 
greater equality shall be pursued through government redistribution, the prior 
goal of the economically liberal model consists in efficiency, which shall be 
achieved through market competition. The conservative occupational regime 
with its social market economy ranks on these dimensions in between. The 
coordination of the economy is left to the market in the economically liberal 
regime, while the state intervenes more strongly by regulation in the familistic 
regime and coordinates as a mediator between the corporations in the social 
democratic regime. The occupational regime with its right to free collective 
bargaining ranks in between. As can be seen at the system of taxation, in 
Sweden the individual stands at the centre, in contrast to the South where the 
family comes first. While the economically liberal model is individualistic too, 
in the social democratic model the individuals are further supported by a social 
safety net. In the conservative occupational model the wages are stratified by 
professional and by marital status, which is similar to the southern regime type. 
The model for gender roles in the more traditional parts of Southern Europe are 
complementary role constructions. As partial modernisation of the male-
breadwinner model one can interpret the dissemination of part-time employment 
of women, which is even more common in the Netherlands than in Germany. In 
the economically liberal regime the guiding principle of "gender neutrality" 
dominates, the state shall not intervene in the privacy, while in the social 
democratic regime the state promotes the "dual-earner model" e.g. by individual 
taxation. As dominant values concerning social security, one finds care by 
family, church and the residual state in the more traditional parts of the 
familistic countries in Southern Europe. In the conservative occupational regime 
these values are complemented by charities, whereat the families are first 
responsible according to the subsidiarity principle. In the economically liberal 
regime one relies first on voluntary assistance, and a residual relied from the 
state is granted only after a needs- and means-test. In the social democratic 
regime, however, the responsibility for social security is assigned to the state. 
Accordingly, the central welfare institutions are the family in the more 
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traditional parts of the South, social assurances in the conservative occupational 
regime, the market in the economically liberal regime and the welfare state in 
the social democratic regime. 
Esping-Andersen (1990, p.70) measures "conservatism" as a dimension of 
stratification among others through the occupational particularism as it is 
reflected in the number of pension schemes ("corporatism"). The conservative 
and the familistic countries have the strongest degree of particularism, the 
highest number of pension schemes is found in Italy (12), followed by France 
(10), Austria and Japan (both 7) and Germany (6). In social democratic Sweden 
there is a distinction between the private and the public sector (hence there are 2 
schemes), but also the economically liberal countries Australia, New Zealand 
and Ireland belong to the universalist pole, there is even only one pension 
system. However, in the economically liberal countries the general level of 
social security is on average significantly lower than in the social democratic 
countries.  
In the more traditional parts of the South, funding of social security is provided 
partly by contributions and partly by the family. The conservative occupational 
regime is funded by contributions from employers and employees. The 
economically liberal residual regime is partly privately funded, and partly by 
state.  In the social democratic regime the welfare state is responsible for 
funding of social securities, which is realized on the basis of a high taxation of 
the citizens.  
Esping-Andersen (1990: 70) measures (economic) “liberalism" as dimension of 
stratification among others by the private share of total health expenditures. 
With 57 %, the economically liberal USA has the highest share of private 
financing. At the other pole, social democratic Norway exhibits only a share of  
1 % private funding. In the familistic countries health care is predominantly 
funded by the state, accordingly we find in Italy a private share in funding of 
only 12 %. The conservative countries range in the middle, Germany e. g. has a 
private share in funding of 20 % (according to the measurement of Esping-
Andersen 1990). 
Citizenship is the basis of the right to social security in the social democratic 
welfare regime; this also applies to the economically liberal regime, however at 
a significantly lower level of social security. In the conservative regime, the 
level of social security is stratified by employment status. In the more traditional 
parts of the South, the family adopts the role of safety provider. Criteria for 
security claims are citizenship (legal resident) in the social democratic regime 
and contributions in the conservative regime. In the familistic regime, need is 
the criterion for security entitlement, in the economically liberal regime, at first 
it is checked whether the needy has no own resources (means-tested). The extent 
of social security is encompassing in the social democratic welfare regime, 
whereas it is only residual in the economically liberal and in the familistic 
regimes.  
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"Socialism" as a dimension of stratification is measured by Esping-Andersen 
(1990, p.70) among others through the equality of benefits, indicated by the ratio 
of the basic benefit to the maximum possible. In this sense universalistic are the 
social democratic countries (Denmark 99 %, Sweden 82 %), but also the two 
liberal countries Australia and New Zealand (100 %). However, in Sweden and 
Denmark ca. 90 % of the population have access to the security system, while 
this is the case for only about 33 % of the population in Australia and New 
Zealand. The level of social security in the conservative regime ranges between 
the social democratic and the economically liberal. While in the social 
democratic welfare regime, the social security benefits are provided especially 
in the form of social services, the benefits in the conservative regime consist 
mainly in financial transfers. In the economically liberal model, there are e. g. 
soup kitchens as a service from the charities and only residual financial benefits 
by the state. 
If in addition to the after-care benefits one takes into account the preventive 
educational institutions, so there is also the question of the key differences in the 
logics of the education systems. An important characteristic of the conservative 
welfare regime is the early selection (generally at the age of 10-12 years) in 
pathways with varying educational perspectives. Both the social democratic and 
the economically liberal welfare regime focus, in a more universalistic way, on 
late differentiation, which according to the results of the PISA studies results on 
average in significantly better performances. On the other hand in the 
economically liberal countries, educational opportunities are structured by the 
high private investments in education. In the social democratic welfare regime, 
this plays only a minor role, so that by these two criteria taken altogether, 
universalism on the educational dimension is most pronounced in the social 
democratic countries. 
In the familistic welfare regime, social assistance is provided rather in the form 
of personal services. Ferrera (1996, 2005) points out that in the South, on the 
one hand the social insurances stand in the Bismarck tradition – that is why 
Esping-Andersen assigns them to the conservative type – ,but on the other hand, 
health care is provided by the state and thus more in line with the Beveridge 
tradition. According to Ferrera (2005), the role of government is generally rather 
weak in the South, because the family has important functions, because of the 
large informal economy and because of the weak administrations. Because 
rational administration is weakly developed, clientelism (services in exchange 
for party support) and patronage (preferential treatment, corruption) play a 
greater role in Southern Europe. 
The "post-socialist countries" in Central and Eastern Europe have in common 
the state socialist past, insofar they are treated in the following provisionally as 
the fifth group of countries, however, these countries are in a process of 
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differentiation into various subgroups. The Eastern European candidate 
countries for the EU have already removed from the state socialist welfare 
regime. But there are also countries like Belarus, which have maintained the 
authoritarian regulation by the state, even though they have adopted the right to 
private ownership of means of production. Therefore Korosteleva (2007) 
characterised Belarus as state capitalist. China is another interesting hybrid 
form, where a Communist Party still regulates in a political authoritarian way, 
but at the same time has initiated a strong economic dynamism by means of the 
market mechanism and promoted by many domestic entrepreneurs, which King / 
Szelényi (2005) characterise as "capitalism from below". In contrast, King / 
Szelényi see e. g. in the case of Russia a "capitalism from above" with few 
domestic entrepreneurs and lower dynamics. The Eastern European EU 
accession countries are characterised by King / Szelényi as liberal systems, in 
which foreign capital plays a greater role than the domestic capital and where 
there is some economic dynamism. The performance of these countries beyond 
mere economic growth will also be studied in detail below. 
As sixth ideal type we distinguish the "Asian capitalism", which is characterised 
by Amable (2003) in particular by the predominantly private tertiary education 
system, while in the liberal Anglo-Saxon type the tertiary education system has 
high enrolment rates and is competitive. Hence, Lane (2007) characterises this 
type as "privatised welfare". In the context of comparative welfare research, the 
term "productivist" seems to me best suited to characterise this welfare logic, in 
which success on the world markets is aimed at through conscious technology 
development to promote economic rise. Concerning the "productivist" welfare 
regime, in the following the institutions and the performance of Japan and South 
Korea are analysed.  
           
2.4  The countries or groups of countries considered 
In the following models of good life are discussed in the way that the selected 
countries will be examined to determine, to what extent they meet socially 
desirable goals. These goals have been worked out as performance criteria in 
advance, through a discussion of moral philosophy. Germany is member of the 
EU, which is why all countries of the EU and prospective candidates are 
considered. Furthermore, in comparative welfare research the Anglo-Saxon 
countries (beyond Great Britain and Ireland) and the East Asian countries Japan 
and South Korea play a role as specific welfare models.  
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Table 2-2:  The 43 countries considered 
Country Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Bulgaria Canada China 
Country 
code 
AUS AUT BEL BRA BUL CAN CHN 
        
Country Croatia 
 
Cyprus Czech 
Republic 
Denmark Estonia Finland France 
Country 
code 
CRO CYP CZ DK EST FIN FR 
        
Country Germany Greece Hungary India Ireland Italy Japan 
Country 
code 
GER GRI HUN IND IRL ITA JP 
        
Country Latvia Lithuani
a 
Luxemb
ourg 
Malta Netherla
nds 
New 
Zealand 
Norway 
Country 
code 
LAT LIT LUX MLT NL NZL NOR 
 
       
Country Poland Portugal Romania Russia Serbia Slovakia Slovenia 
Country 
code 
POL POR ROM RUS SRB SLK SLV 
        
Country South 
Africa 
South 
Korea 
Spain Sweden Switzerl
and 
Turkey United 
Kingdom   
Country 
code 
RSA KOR SPA SWE SWI TUR UK 
 
Country United 
States 
Country 
code 
USA 
 
As economically important nations, all BRICS countries are taken into account, 
though they still have so many development problems, that they are not strictly 
comparable with the more developed countries. 
In the following, 43 countries are taken into account, which play a special role in 
the investigation of the social structure of the Federal Republic in international 
comparison and in comparative welfare research as well as in the political 
context of the EU and its enlargement. In Table 2-2, the selected 43 countries 
are listed each with its country name and with a national, well recognisable code 
for the following pictures.  
Through region, language and culture, discourse relationships and learning 
processes arise, which Castles has called "families of nations". Esping-Andersen 
(1990) distinguishes different welfare logics, the development of which could be 
partially explained with the concept of "families of nations". The fertility of the 
idea of the distinction between different welfare logics can also be seen in the 
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fact that the various educational systems could be similarly classified in 
corresponding educational regimes. According to the different logics of welfare 
production, most countries can be relatively clearly assigned to one of the 
different welfare regimes: 
Social democratic: Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark 
Conservative:  Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium,  France, 
    Luxembourg, Switzerland 
The Netherlands are classified by Esping-Andersen (1990) as "social 
democratic", but the cluster analysis of Esping-Andersen's data by Obinger / 
Wagschal (1998) places the Netherlands in immediate proximity to Germany. 
The analysis of Ostner (1995) and our own analysis suggest an allocation of the 
Netherlands to the conservative welfare logic: If in the triangle of welfare 
production - state / market / family – one takes greater account of the family, 
one remarks for example, that women in the Netherlands work mainly in part-
time and, therefore, women have a relatively small share in the volume of paid 
employment, i.e. women reversely are more involved in the production of 
welfare in the family context. 
Switzerland exhibits in particular conservative elements, which can be seen e.g. 
in the gender roles, on the other hand by its function in the international 
financial system also liberal and finally some social democratic elements, 
because in the political model of consociational democracy the major parties are 
all involved in the government. However, according to our analyses of the 
institutions, by now the conservative welfare logic dominates on the whole. 
Also in Luxembourg in addition to the status-conserving elements, one finds 
some liberal elements because of its function as an important investment place 
in the international financial system. But according to our analyses of the 
institutions, the conservative welfare logic dominates by far. 
Economically liberal: USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, UK, Ireland 
Ireland has the additional characteristic of being influenced by the Catholic 
church. With regard to gender roles, Ireland is therefore more conservative than 
the other liberal countries. However, the economically liberal welfare logic 
dominates. 
Familistic:   Greece, Italy Spain, Portugal, Malta, Cyprus  
Post socialist:  Russia; Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Czech Republic, 
    Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; 
    Croatia, Serbia 
In this preliminary grouping due to the common state socialist past, Russia tends 
to be a border case, because in some developments (for example in the poverty 
rate) Russia falls behind the other Eastern European countries. 
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Productivist: Japan, South Korea 
Japan: Japan is a mixed-type having both conservative and economically liberal 
characteristics. Amable (2003) characterises this as "Asian capitalism", where 
the welfare is in so far privatised, that the tertiary education system is financed 
privately in comparatively high degree. The welfare logic can be characterised 
as "productivist", because the economic rise shall be achieved through conscious 
technology promotion with successes on the world market. 
 
Special cases: 
Turkey: Turkey is i. a. as a candidate of the EU of particular interest. Due to the 
lower socio-economic development level, Turkey is examined as a special case. 
South Africa: As a growing emerging market, South Africa is by now counted to 
the enlarged "BRICS" group. The residual welfare regime makes informal 
networks for social security necessary ("informal security regime"). 
Brazil: Brazil has a residual welfare regime with a very large informal sector 
(hence also: "informal security regime"). 
China: China exhibits the unusual combination of an ideologically communist 
government and a dynamic capitalist development. 
India: In India, in the social security systems so far much is only programme, 
with a lack of implementation. There is a very large informal sector (hence also: 
"informal security regime"). 
 
2.5 Different paths of modernisation 
According to my analyses, it is advisable not to claim a single path of 
modernisation towards growth, participation and inclusion. The different logics 
of welfare production, in which the fundamental values of the various societies 
are reflected and which lead to differing institutional development paths of 
societies, are probably the most fruitful approach to distinguish different social 
"worlds". Besides the three "worlds" of Esping-Andersen – as ideal types: the 
social democratic, the economically liberal and the conservative welfare regime 
– one should, as established in Section 2.3, distinguish the "familistic" welfare 
regime of Southern Europe and – because of the common state socialist past – 
the group of post socialist countries, which are however in a process of 
differentiation. Furthermore, the productivist welfare regime of East Asia is 
considered, which strives for economic advancement through export successes 
on the world market. 
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It will now be shown, in particular in terms of income inequality and poverty, 
that the basic logics of these six welfare regimes differ significantly. 
- Social democratic: In the Scandinavian welfare states the norm of equal 
social rights dominates. Therefore, the social security systems are formed 
in a universalistic way, the systems are not stratified by the status in the 
employment system. Persons are taxed as individuals, the encompassing 
benefits can only be financed in nearly full employment – of men and 
women. The income inequality and the poverty rates are kept low, since 
by activating educational and labour market policies provision is made 
preventively to combat poverty and through fiscal redistribution gross 
income inequality is reduced. 
- Economically liberal: In the economically liberal states greater emphasis 
is laid on the market mechanism and on a general competitive orientation. 
The relatively dynamic development of business and employment 
opportunities are the basis of the comparatively high prosperity of the 
liberal regime. Because equality is interpreted in the dominant guiding 
principle as equal opportunities, the individual is primarily responsible for 
his social security and welfare support will be only provided after a strict 
means test. Therefore, in this development path one can find rather great 
income inequality and high poverty rates. 
- Status-conserving: In the status-conserving or conservative welfare states, 
subtle differences in social security are made, but at a medium security 
level. Therefore, both the income inequality and the poverty rates tend to 
be in the middle range. The formation of this welfare regime is based on 
the core values of social security – the protection against risks –, on the 
stability of life courses and the integration into the community, often 
realized in clubs and in the associations of civil society. 
- Familistic: The less prosperous countries of Southern Europe are on the 
one hand rather status-conserving, but on the other hand, they use less 
wealth for social security. Instead, they complement the familiar 
responsibility for care only by a residual welfare state. Inequality and 
poverty rates tend rather towards the high levels of the economically 
liberal countries. If as guiding concept, the family is conceived as the 
primary producer of welfare and gives the responsibility for reproductive 
and care work to the family, there should be also strong financial support 
for the family, but this is hardly the case in the residual welfare state. As a 
result, in the familistic welfare regime, the birth rates are the lowest. 
- Post socialist: The post socialist countries run rather fast through the 
current modernisation processes. Starting from an egalitarian tradition, 
social inequalities have widened in the transformation processes. 
 According to my observations, the group of post-socialist countries forms 
 no uniform welfare system, but rather the post-socialist countries with 
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 their common egalitarian past differentiate into diverging paths with 
 regard to inequality. From the post socialist countries, e.g. Slovenia and 
 the Czech Republic exhibit a low level of inequality. In Poland one finds 
 an average level of inequality. By now, Russia has a high level of 
 inequality, similar to the USA. 
 The EU enlargement should help to support the catch-up process in 
 welfare levels in the accession countries. 
- Productivist: Japan has developed the model of an economically strong 
rise compared to many other countries, by successes on the world market 
through a systematic promotion of research and development. This model 
is now successfully performed by South Korea, too. 
 
3. Societies’ capacity for innovation in an empirical comparison 
 
Capacity for innovation as a socially desirable goal 
Innovations describe new developments, inventions or ideas, which help to 
improve the quality of life. From the perspective of macroeconomics innovation 
systems are important to produce new knowledge and technologies that can be 
utilized to stimulate economic growth. Innovation thus is the foundation for 
future prosperity.  
Innovations provide an opportunity to undertake particularly qualified 
productions and services in the world division of labour and thereby gain 
competitive advantage. A high standard of living is in general based on an 
advantageous position in the world division of labour, which can only be 
secured over time, if accompanied by a high level of educational and 
professional qualifications and a high degree of innovation in the products. 
 
Selection of indicators 
The expenditures for research and development are the most important input for 
the innovative capacity of a country. High expenditures on research and 
development indicate a high level of research with the latest technological 
equipment. This creates favourable conditions for new insights and innovative 
results. In 2012 in the EU28 55 % of the expenditures on research and 
development were financed by business enterprises and 33% by the government 
(10% were financed from abroad). Therefore, in the following the private 
expenditures (in detail: the expenditure of business enterprises) and public 
spending (in detail: government expenditures) for research and development are 
used as indicators for the input of innovation.  
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The spread of modern information and communication technology within the 
population, here specifically the internet users per 100 inhabitants, is considered 
as a further performance criterion for innovation systems. The utilisation rates 
show the extent to which a population is capable to participate in technological 
innovations. The internet as a "data highway" is something like an intervening 
variable in the innovation process. On the one hand, the spread of the internet is 
already a result of investments in research and development, on the other hand, 
the internet favours the dissemination of innovation processes. 
Patents are a measurable result of the effectiveness of an innovation system, 
since they protect in particular the economical exploitation of the new findings. 
To include only the economically most important patents, we use the triadic 
patents as indicator. Triadic patents only consider inventions that are 
simultaneously protected at the three main patent offices – the European Patent 
Office for Europe, the Japanese Patent Office in Japan and the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office in the United States. Thus, only the patents that 
represent a particularly high economic value are counted. 
To obtain a summary index for innovation, on the one hand, both standardised 
expenditures indicators are combined into one sub-index for the input. On the 
other hand, the standardised indicators of usage of the internet and the patents 
are combined into one sub-index for the output. On the basis of the two 
standardised partial indices the total index for the innovative ability is formed, 
which gives the same weight to the input and the output. 
 
The capacity for innovation across countries 
Concerning public investment (government financed) in research and 
development as a percentage of GDP, the social-democratic countries Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland (places 3-5) are part of the top performers. The 
conservative countries Austria with the first place and Germany with the sixth 
place as well as South Korea with the second place complete the top group. As 
part of the GDP the post-socialist countries Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey 
invest least in research and development. 
As for private investments in research and development (business enterprise 
expenditures) the "productivist" countries South Korea and Japan are at the top, 
in doing so the large companies are coordinated by the state. The ideas about the 
responsibility of private enterprises and government vary between national 
cultures. Japan ranges on the second place in private investments, but ranks on 
the 20th place in public investments. The social democratic countries Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark are also at the forefront. The conservative countries 
Switzerland and Austria complete the top group. Germany reaches the 10th 
place. The post-socialist countries Latvia and Romania as well as India and 
Cyprus range at the very end. 
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Concerning the internet users per 100 inhabitants, the social democratic 
countries Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland are at the forefront. The 
conservative countries Luxembourg and the Netherlands complete the top group. 
Germany (with 86 users per 100) reaches the 12th rank. The usage of the 
internet is the least common in the post-socialist countries Bulgaria, Romania 
and Serbia as well as in Turkey, China, South Africa and finally India, where 
only 18 out of 100 inhabitants use the internet.  
Considering the economic exploitation of innovations through patents in recent 
decades Japan performed best, which owes its rise after the Second World War 
in particular to the focus on the development of technology and export 
efficiency on the world market, with a separate ministry responsible for the 
coordination of the innovation politics of the large enterprises. Japan has 
declined somewhat in recent years, so that now Switzerland is at the top. 
Germany has improved slightly and is now in the top group along with Austria 
as well as Sweden and Denmark and also South Korea. These are also the 
countries which invest relatively most in research and development. Concerning 
the important patents (per million inhabitants), Brazil and India are still at the 
very end.  
Concerning the input index of innovation (with the same weight of the 
standardised values of the public and the private spending on research and 
development) the productivist countries Korea and Japan are at the top, in which 
the business enterprises engage strongly in research and development. Besides 
the social democratic countries Sweden, Finland and Denmark the conservative 
countries Austria and Germany complete the top group. The post-socialist 
countries Latvia and Romania as well as Cyprus rank at the very end. 
Considering the output index of innovation (with the same weight of the 
standardised values for internet usage and important patents) Switzerland and 
Japan are at the top because of their successful patent policy. The social 
democratic countries Denmark and Sweden score well, too. Germany, on the 6th 
place, also belongs to the top group. India ranges by far at the very end.  
If we combine the standardised sub-indices of the two input and the two output 
indicators of equal weight into a summary index, the productivist countries 
Korea and Japan as well as the social democratic countries Sweden, Denmark 
and Finland as well as the conservative countries Switzerland, Austria and 
Germany reach the highest values. Germany also scores well with the 8th place. 
The capacity for innovation is least developed in the post-socialist countries 
Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia as well as in the emerging markets of South 
Africa and India in particular. 
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The development of public investments in research and development 
According to the Innovation Union Scoreboard 2015 of the European 
Commission, the public expenditures on research and development as a 
percentage of GDP in the EU28 have increased by an average of 1,9 percent 
from 2006 to 2013, despite the financial crisis. From the leaders Denmark and 
South Korea have the strongest growth with an average of 5 percent each, but 
these investments have also increased with an average of 3,5 percent 
disproportionately high in Germany. 
In the final group (Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey) the growth in Bulgaria was 
negative with an average of -4,3 percent, these public investments for research 
and development have been reduced in the financial crisis.  
Looking at the development in each year more precisely, the data for the OECD 
show that the proportion of public expenditures on research and development 
decreases after 2009, however, as in the EU28, in 2013 it lies a little above the 
level of 2007. The growth of public investments in research and development 
has therefore been affected by the financial crisis. 
 
The development of private investments in research and development 
Private expenditures on research and development as a portion of the GDP rose 
in the EU28 from 2006 to 2013 on average by 1,9 percent according to the 
Innovation Scoreboard 2015. In the top group (South Korea, Japan, Finland and 
Sweden) these investments have risen on average by 15 percent in South Korea 
from 2006 to 2013 according to the OECD, which is exceptionally strong. The 
increase in Germany was slightly above the EU28 average score (1,9) with an 
average of 2,1 percent. 
In the final group (Latvia, India, Romania and Cyprus) those investments have 
been reduced in Cyprus by an average of 3,5 percent, in Romania by an average 
of 5,6 percent and in Latvia by an average of 9,0 percent from 2006 to 2013. 
Latvia also had the biggest economic slump after the financial crisis. 
Looking at the development in each year more precisely, the data for the OECD 
show that private investments in research and development have fallen from 
2008 to 2009 and from 2009 to 2010. Until 2013, however, these investments 
have increased above the level of 2006 as in the EU28. Private investments in 
research and development have been quite impaired due to the financial crisis. 
 
The development of the number of internet users 
The number of internet users (per 100 inhabitants) has grown from year to year 
in the period from 2005 to 2014 according to the World Bank. 
In the leading group (Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden 
and Finland) the increases diminish in this period, starting from 95% of users the 
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saturation point seems gradually to be approached. In Germany with 86% of 
internet users there is still room for improvement. 
In the final group Turkey improved from 16% to 51% in the period from 2005 to 
2014, China from 9% to 49%, South Africa from 8% to 49% and finally India 
from 2% to 18%. This means that the differences in the average level of 
technological development are still enormous. In the development of internet 
use there does not seem to be such a striking effect of the financial crisis. The 
technological modernisation process is relatively uniform, but on different 
levels. 
 
The development of the number of important patents 
Looking at the period from 2006 to 2013, Switzerland has overtaken Japan at the 
top (see OECD). By now Germany displaced Sweden on the third place. 
Denmark improved to the fifth place. South Korea’s development was the most 
dynamic. Concerning the triadic patents Korea has now reached the sixth place, 
concerning all patents South Korea would be ahead of Japan at the top. 
The final group (India, Brazil, Romania, Turkey and Greece) has a large backlog 
and develops only slowly. 
Altogether in the development of important patents there is no great effect of the 
financial crisis. 
 
The development of innovative capacity in total 
The public investments in research and development as a share of GDP have 
declined after 2009 according to the OECD, in 2013 however, the investments in 
the OECD and also in the EU28 are above the level of 2006. The growth of 
public investments in research and development has suffered a setback because 
of the financial crisis. 
The private expenditures on research and development as a share of GDP have 
declined a little from 2008 to 2009 and from 2009 to 2010 according to the 
OECD. Although private investments in research and development have 
increased until 2013 again somewhat above the level of 2008, growth was 
adversely affected by the financial crisis. 
The impact of the financial crisis on the number of internet users is relatively 
low. The development is more like a general technological modernisation, 
although some countries - such as India - develop rather slowly on average. 
In the development of important patents, the effects of the financial crisis are 
rather small. The technology policy of South Korea and Japan lead to a high 
competitiveness of the productivist welfare regime. 
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In Germany public expenditures on research and development as a share of GDP 
rose on average by 3,5 percent from 2006 to 2013, which is more than in the 
EU28 (1,9%). The growth in private investments for research and development 
was on average 2,1 percent from 2006 to 2013, which is slightly above the 
EU28- average of 1,9%. Concerning the number of internet users (per 100 
inhabitants), Germany reached 86%, so that there is still room for improvement 
to Norway and Denmark, which are about 95%. In the number of important 
patents in relation to the population, Germany has now reached the third place 
behind Switzerland and Japan. With its innovative capacity Germany achieved 
the best place of all performance criteria, namely place 8. 
 
4. The global financial crisis and the Euro crisis as current 
challenges 
 
From the regular economic crises two are outstanding: the world economic crisis 
starting in 1929 and the global financial crisis starting in 2008. In December 
1930 Keynes proposed that the state closes the demand gap by making 
meaningful investments in the future as a response to the economic crisis, which 
was a result of an exaggerated monetary expansion in the USA, reflected in a 
stock boom and bust. However, the governments all responded with 
protectionism. 
The question arises what the causes of the current crisis might be, which by its 
magnitude is the second global financial crisis. The US-American Law on the 
Regulation of Banks (Glass-Steagall Act), which was introduced in 1933 in 
response to the world financial and world economic crisis (1929-1933), was 
abolished under the Clinton administration under the pressure of the banks. 
After the bursting of the Dotcom bubble in March 2000 the US Federal Reserve 
favoured with the policy of low-interest rates the subsequent real estate bubble. 
The US Federal Reserve counted the stimulation of the economy to its tasks, but 
not yet the containment of “asset inflation”. Through the securitisation of 
mixtures of mortgage loans the risks were distributed by the American banks to 
the entire world. After the political mistake of not protecting the investment 
bank Lehman Brothers from insolvency in September 2008, the panic-like chain 
reaction in the global financial system began. The second global economic crisis 
did not emerge because the governments saved the banks and coordinated with 
Keynesian economic stimulus packages. Without further regulation, however, 
the large volume of rent-seeking capital still carries risks.  
Systematically, one can distinguish as main causes of the global financial crisis: 
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1. Politics:  
a) Household debt in the USA: American policy has promoted the purchase 
of property on credit – under the framework of extremely low interest 
rates –, which initially generated a housing price boom, which then led to 
the crash of the housing prices when the speculative bubble burst, and to 
overindebtedness of households and to the collapse of consumption. 
b) Government debt of the USA: US military intervention also has the 
economic aspect that the US governments are indebted to the rest of the 
world.  
c) The unequal distribution of wealth leads to a large volume of rent-seeking 
capital. 
 
2. Economy:  
Through financial innovations, the rest of the world was involved in the risks 
and ultimately the financing of American lending, with the intransparent 
financial products sold with a bonus system. (A real estate crisis was not only 
to be found in the USA, but there was, e. g. also a real estate boom and bust 
in Spain.)  
 
What is to be done? 
Joseph E. Stiglitz suggests – in addition to “Keynesian” economic stimulus 
packages – to focus on regulation, because of the policy and market failures: 
„The design of regulatory structures and systems has to take into account  
a) asymmetries of information – the regulator often is at an informational 
disadvantage relative to the regulated;  
b) moral hazard – there are often problems in ensuring that the regulator’s 
behavior is consistent with social welfare, e.g. that he is not captured by 
those whom he is supposed to be regulating; and  
c) human fallibility – mistakes are inevitable, and one needs to minimize the 
costs of such mistakes. Well-designed regulations take into account the 
limitations of implementation and enforcement. While no regulatory system 
is perfect, economies with well-designed regulations can perform far better 
than those with inadequate regulation. Regulations can both enhance 
markets and protect those who might otherwise suffer in unregulated 
markets.” (Joseph E. Stiglitz, April 2009) 
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After all, the American government and the European, Chinese, etc. 
governments coped much better with this global financial crisis than with the 
first.  
 
From the global financial crisis to the great recession and to the state debt 
crises  
The bursting of the real estate price bubble in the USA led to a global credit and 
banking crisis due to the global trading of credit securitisations. The USA, Great 
Britain, Iceland and Ireland were the most heavily involved and were 
particularly affected by the banking crisis (see also Farnsworth/Irving 2012).  
The major recession following the credit crisis led to a sharp decline in exports 
in Germany, China, Finland and Sweden (see also Farnsworth/Irving 2012). 
Germany and China, however, balanced this out by stimulating the internal 
market. Sweden and Finland had already learned during the previous 
Scandinavian financial crisis how to handle such a situation.  
Because of the necessary bank rescues (“too big to fail”) due to the global 
financial crisis and the necessary economic stimulus programmes due to the big 
recession, many nations have been hit by government debts. Due to the large 
banking crises, Ireland, Iceland and finally Spain were especially concerned. 
Because of the low competitiveness in the big recession, particularly Greece and 
Portugal were strongly hit as well. The debt of Greece was the starting for the 
next Euro crisis, which revealed some weaknesses in the construction of the 
Euro-zone.  
 
The Euro crisis 
The bank rescues and the economic stimulus programmes have led to an 
increase in the government debts, which acted as a stress test for the European 
monetary union, which had not yet been fully secured in the institutions. In a 
monetary union of heterogeneous economies, political and economic institutions 
are needed to deal with various “shocks”.  
Eichengreen (2010) compares the Euro crisis after realising the real extent of the 
Greek government debt with the crisis of confidence following the fall of the 
Lehman Brothers in the USA in the autumn of 2008. 
When dealing with the Euro crisis, the connections between the banking, 
sovereign debt and growth crisis must always be taken into consideration (see 
Jay C. Shambough, “The Euro's Three Crises”), that is why the solution is so 
lengthy. Shambough discusses the interweaving of (1) banking crisis that led to 
the (2) sovereign debt crisis, which in turn led to a (3) growth crisis. As in a 
“vicious circle” (spiraling downwards) the falling prices of the assets again 
weaken the bank balances, etc. Conversely, the economic crisis weakened the 
indebted states, the weakening of the states leads to a depreciation of the assets 
of the banks in the form of government bonds, the weakened banks will limit the 
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lending of credits and thereby undermine the growth. Because of this 
interdependence of the problems, measures, which improve a problematic 
situation, but at the same time worsen another problem situation, are suboptimal. 
Shambough therefore recommends an integrated package of measures, which is 
sketched as follows:  
Governments in deficit countries should reduce taxes on labour (instead of wage 
reductions) and increase consumption. At the same time, surplus countries like 
Germany should strengthen consumption in order to promote growth.  
The ECB should also reduce the long-term interest rates. A higher nominal GDP 
growth would facilitate the sustainability of the debts. 
The ECB could strengthen its policies with the aim of lower long-term bond 
yields.  
The banks could be recapitalised via EFSF funds to reduce the interdependence 
of the sovereign debt crisis and of the banking crisis. 
Surplus countries such as Germany could fiscally expand, which, by stronger 
growth, would be beneficial for all. 
 
This package would strengthen the growth of the Euro-zone through fiscal 
policies, bank recapitalisation and monetary policies. The previous limitation on 
the reduction of government expenditure in the crisis countries leads to sub-
optimal results. Regulation and monitoring of the banks are needed across the 
Euro-zone. Furthermore, a common low-risk Euro-zone loan, in contrast to 
riskier bonds with higher yields, would reduce the interdependence of sovereign 
debt crisis and banking crisis. – A monetary union must be completed by a 
finance union (not a fiscal union), according to these arguments from 
Shambough (2012).  
The big line for the EU as a political project would be a common “Marshall 
Plan” for the “crisis countries”, a European brainstorming of the most fruitful 
investments in these countries and the most favourable possibilities for 
implementation. 
The increased public debt creates pressure, which in some societies is passed on 
to the social security systems. On the other hand, social security systems are 
automatic stabilisers in the economic crises. There are also other good reasons to 
develop systems for the promotion and maintenance of “human capital”. 
The effects of the financial crisis can be well investigated in terms of the 
performance with regard to the socially desirable goals, which we consider: 
prosperity; environmental sustainability; innovation; social protection by social 
spending in the case of risk events as well as precautionary by means of 
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investments in education; recognition of peculiarities (friendliness towards 
women and friendliness towards migrants); equality of participation; social 
integration; autonomy (freedom of choice and capabilities).  
 
5.  Education and social security as well as capability to autonomy 
 
In the following we will discuss the extent to which the various states that 
emphasise, on the basis of the raised budget, more for the aftercare protection of 
the welfare state in case of the occurrence of risks, such as unemployment, or 
more strongly on prevention by investing in education and training (see chapter 
5.1). 
However, the investments in education are not only precautionary in order to 
better cope with occurring problems, but also the basis to make formal freedom 
of choice to factual freedom of choice by empowering the people to choose the 
way of life which to appreciate they have good reasons. In addition to the 
objective empowerment and capability of autonomy, which can be 
operationalised by education competencies and certificates, in the 
operationalisation of autonomy we also consider the population’s subjective 
evaluation of the freedom to choose one's own way of life (see chapter 5.2) 
 
5.1 Education and aftercare social security in the different countries and 
welfare regimes 
Social Security: Prevention through education and safety net in case of risk 
as socially desirable goals  
A key task of the welfare state is to safeguard the individual actors against risks 
as illness, unemployment, invalidity, etc. The welfare state provides in these 
cases at least a subsistence level, in the conservative logic also for the 
maintenance of living standards. Such failures arise, for instance, as a result of 
loss of income due to unemployment. Thus, the own life plans can be pursued 
continuously and are secured against important life risks. So as stability of the 
material supply we mean that a minimum supply by the state or other 
institutions will also be ensured when a person cannot take care of themselves 
from their own resources. 
The desired goal to stabilise life plans against risk can be achieved in two 
different ways. The aftercare welfare state strives to compensate for the material 
loss if a particular risk, e.g. unemployment has already occurred. The preventive 
welfare state, however, intends not to let that happen; it tries to minimise the 
likelihood of the occurrence of risks by prophylactic measures such as education 
and training. According to the mission statement of the activating welfare state 
citizens should not only be the passive recipients of transfer payments, but 
should be enabled to acquire the skills, through which they can protect 
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themselves against risks. To succeed with such a strategy of “promoting and 
demanding” the state must, however, provide a supportive public infrastructure. 
 
Selection of indicators  
Both aspects of the welfare state – the material supply in case of need as well as 
the active prevention – shall be represented by appropriate indicators. The social 
spending of the welfare state as a percentage of GDP is thereby an indication of 
the size of income replacement rates after the occurrence of risk events. If one 
were to consider also the private spending for health, liberal countries would 
have high expenditures in the aggregate, but these are very unevenly distributed. 
This is less adequate for the partial explanation of income poverty. Public and 
private spending on education show how strongly the society invests in risk 
prevention. This indicator is adequate to partially explain educational poverty. A 
good example is South Korea which has set its focus clearly on education, but 
with a high private share. 
Out of the two standardised indicators an average value is finally calculated 
which is in turn standardised, so the scales of the performance are comparable 
through the whole book. This is the overall index for social security. 
 
Comparison between the countries 
In social spending (as a share of GDP) the social democratic countries Finland, 
Denmark and Sweden as well as the conservative countries France, Belgium and 
Austria reach the top. Until 1990 social spending of West Germany ranged at an 
intermediate level among the countries, as a result of German unification the 
need for social expenditures has risen, so that Germany is now to be found on 
place 9. At the lower end of the ranking one finds the emerging markets Turkey, 
South Korea, South Africa and at the very end China and India whose social 
spending is still very rudimentary.  
Concerning the precautionary public and private spending on education (as a 
share of GDP) at the top we find the social democratic countries Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland as well as Cyprus and Malta (which have specialised 
themselves as tax havens) and Great Britain. In these countries about 7 to 9 % of 
GDP are spent on education. In Germany this share is significantly lower with 
5,5 % (rank 24 of 43). The end of the ranking is formed by China and India as 
well as Romania, which provide the least resources for the education of their 
population.  
On the whole, social security is best developed in the social democratic 
countries Denmark, Finland and Sweden as well as in the conservative states 
Belgium and France according to the overall index. Germany is ranked on place 
15 because it reaches place 9 in the aftercare of the welfare state, but only place 
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24 in terms of prevention through education. At the very end of the ranking we 
find Turkey and Romania as well as China and India.  
 
On the development of social expenditures   
In the economic crisis of 2009 the domestic product slumped in almost all 
countries. Unemployment has increased in 2009. Because of these two 
developments social spending increased as a share of GDP. According to 
Eurostat 2016, in the EU27 the share of social expenditures in GDP increased on 
average from 26,1 % in 2005 to 28,8 % in the crisis of 2009, and was reduced to 
28,6 % in 2012. According to OECD 2016, in the OECD the share of social 
expenditures in GDP rose on average from 19,4 % in 2005 to 21,9 % in the 
crisis of 2009, and was reduced to 21,6 % in 2014.  
In the crisis year 2009 the proportion of social expenditure in GDP (see Eurostat 
2016) rose in the EU27 by 10,8 % compared to the previous year. Significantly 
disproportionately is the increase of unemployment and the necessary social 
spending in the economically liberal Baltic States: +39,2 % in Latvia, +32,1 % 
in Lithuania, 27,9 % in Estonia. In Ireland, which was strongly hit by the crisis, 
too, we find an increase of 18,9 %. By contrast, in Poland with its orientation on 
the domestic market, there is an increase of only 5,2 %. 
The increase in social spending is due to rising unemployment and cannot be 
equated with an increasing generosity, this would require the replacement rates 
(or the extent of de-commodification). According to OECD data the share of 
social spending decreases with declining unemployment from 21,9 % of GDP in 
the crisis of 2009 to 21,6 % in 2014. The standards of the welfare states are still 
under pressure due to the general financial consolidation course after the global 
financial crisis.  
 
On the development of educational spending  
Since the GDP slumped during the crisis of 2009 in almost all countries, the 
proportion of (absolute relative stable) educational spending rises in 2009. 
In the EU27 the proportion of educational spending increases from 5,4 % of the 
GDP in 2005 to 5,7 % in 2009. In absolute numbers, there tends to be a general 
slight increase in educational spending. The investment in education as well as 
in research and development are options to react to the economic crisis, in so far 
educational spending is under less pressure.  
From 2008 to the year of crisis 2009 educational spending rose slightly at 
current prices in the EU27. In the EU27, expenditures on education as a share of 
GDP rose by 0,4 percentage. A positive example is Denmark whose 
expenditures on education increased despite the crisis both in absolute terms and 
by 0,8 percentage of GDP.  
In the OECD-countries educational spending as a share of GDP increased from 
2008 to the year of crisis 2009 on average from ca. 4,9 percentage to ca. 5,2 
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percentage, which is likely to be due to the fall in GDP, since absolute 
expenditures on education cannot be changed so quickly. From 2010 to 
2012/2013 this share remained constant at about 5,2 percent according to OECD 
2016.  
 
On the development of educational and social spending altogether   
On the whole, social spending rose in the crisis only due to the increasing 
unemployment, but afterwards was reduced again. The generosity of the welfare 
state (measured by the replacement rates) is still under pressure because of the 
widespread consolidation course.  
Expenditures on education are generally increased rather steadily because 
investments in education as well as in research and development are meaningful 
answers to increase flexibility among the difficult conditions of the global 
financial crisis.  
In Denmark the development of educational and social issues is particularly 
balanced. South Korea definitely focuses on an economic rise on the world 
market by investing in education as well as in research and development, which 
is already reflected by the success of South Korea on the global market. 
Germany has steadily increased its educational spending starting from too low a 
level, however, as share of GDP the educational spending is still below the 
EU27 average and also below the OECD average.  
 
Educational and welfare regimes  
If one compares the aftercare aspect of social spending and the aspect of 
prevention by investments in education, Germany belongs to the countries that 
are primarily focused on aftercare. 
Denmark is the country that is the most balanced in belonging to the top both in 
preventive educational spending as well as in aftercare social spending, which is 
why it is also by far at the top in the overall index of social security. All social- 
democratic countries of Scandinavia are above the international average both in 
terms of prevention by education as well as in aftercare social spending. 
The most striking profile with a clear focus on prevention by investing in 
education, research and development can be found in productivist South Korea, 
which on the other hand, ranges at the end concerning the aftercare social 
spending. The economically liberal countries USA and Canada are above the 
international average in the prevention by educational investments, but below 
average in the aftercare social spending. 
The prototype of the onesided focus on the aftercare social spending is Italy 
which uses its resources particularly in the form of pensions. Also the familistic 
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countries Greece, Spain and Portugal are above the international average in 
aftercare social spending, but below the average in the prevention by educational 
investments. 
The familistic countries Cyprus and Malta are special cases because these island 
nations have specialised themselves as tax havens. Although Malta has no 
conspicuous nominal tax rate, but refunds a high proportion of taxes to foreign 
investors at their request, with the result of a very low real tax rate. Cyprus has 
specialised in the management of money capital. The activities of these 
countries are founded upon very large investments in the educational system. 
Among the countries that are below the international average both in the 
prevention by educational investments as well as in the aftercare social spending 
we find the Russia, Romania and Bulgaria. Slovenia, as an exception among the 
post-socialist countries, is already above the international average for social 
protection. The emerging markets of India and China as well as Turkey are 
clearly below the international average both in terms of prevention by 
educational investments as well as in aftercare social spending. 
In contrast to South Korea, which focuses clearly on prevention by investments 
in education, research and development, Japan is a more traditional country that 
focuses more on aftercare social spending. Germany also belongs to these 
traditional countries, since it ranks on place 9 in aftercare social spending, but 
ranges only on place 24 in the forward-looking investments in education.  
Hence there is partial evidence for the distinction of four educational and 
welfare regimes (see table 5-1.).  
 
Table 5-1: Educational and welfare regimes 
Pronounced prevention 
through education  
Activating society  
(focus on capability and 
prevention) 
Developed educational 
and welfare state 
Little prevention  
through education 
Underdeveloped  
educational and  
welfare state 
Traditional (passive) 
welfare state  
 Little  
aftercare social spending  
Pronounced aftercare 
social spending  
Model: Dieter Holtmann 
 
Social-democratic countries, in particular Denmark, rely on prevention through 
education, but also provides a well-developed social safety net for the case of 
risk events. The economically liberal US and in particular the productivist South 
Korea focus on prevention by investments in education and leave the protection 
against risks to private responsibility. Familistic countries such as Italy set their 
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priority on aftercare social spending and neglect the prevention through 
investments in education. Less developed countries such as India and China as 
well as Turkey also invest primarily in infrastructure, but neither sufficiently in 
aftercare social spending nor in prevention through educational investments. The 
post-socialist countries are mostly still in catching-up process of development 
and, with the exception of Slovenia, still range below the international average 
in terms of prevention by educational investments. 
 
5.2 Autonomy as the capability to self-determined action in the different 
countries and welfare regimes 
Autonomy as socially desirable goal  
In the centre of the normative theory of Nobel laureate Amartya Sen stands the 
concept of freedom. According to Sen (2002) it is too one-sided to define the 
quality of life of individuals and entire societies only on the basis of their 
material wealth, as was practiced for long, e. g. in the poverty and wealth 
reporting. Instead it is more adequate to assess the individual life circumstances 
and the overall social development with the criterion of realisation of life 
chances. By realisation of life chances Sen understands the capacity of people to 
lead a self-determined life, i. e. to pursue the way of life that they have good 
reasons to appreciate. This implies that people should get the capability to 
recognise their own way of life, to judge and select between alternative ways of 
life deliberately and with good reasons. To achieve this, on the one hand the 
individual potential of people need to be developed, e. g. by access to 
educational institutions, on the other hand also limitations to actions and lack of 
freedom must be removed. To have the possibility to lead a self-determined life 
depends not only on the intellectual ability, but also on the external conditions. 
Also the comparison of countries and welfare regimes can be based on the 
concept of capacities of life chances: “The success of a society according to this 
view is primarily to be evaluated by how big the substantial freedoms realised 
by its members are” (see Sen 2002: 30). Of course it is complicated to set up an 
empirical measurement model for substantive freedoms, because for this many 
and very different aspects must be taken into account: education, income, 
political and civil liberties, working conditions, a secure habitat, etc. All these 
aspects play a role, when assessing the autonomy of a person. The following 
analysis particularly concentrates on the educational opportunities and basic 
capabilities as well as the subjective evaluation of freedom of choice by the 
people of different countries and welfare regimes. While these features do not 
form sufficient criteria for autonomy, they are, however, necessary prerequisites 
for autonomy. 
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Selection of indicators  
Although the chances of realising self-fulfilment must not be reduced only to 
educational chances, cognitive resources are of course a key prerequisite for the 
real freedoms that an actor enjoys. As indicators for the objective conditions for 
autonomy, we therefore consider the expenditures on education, tertiary 
educational attainment (certificates) as well as the educational abilities acquired 
in the school system (average and peak of the competences according to PISA). 
The problems of income poverty and income inequality as well as educational 
poverty are discussed separately in the chapter on social equality (see section 
6.9). Furthermore, we consider the subjective assessment (by the society 
members) of the freedom of choice concerning the way of life. 
The investment in education systems (as a percentage of GDP) may be regarded 
as an indicator of the willingness of a society to invest in the education of people 
and to enable them to self-determined action. Public and private expenditures on 
education are considered together, since educational processes, in our opinion, 
are always beneficial for the chances of realising self-fulfilment – regardless of 
the financial source. 
The results of the educational investments are shown by two aspects: on the one 
hand, we measure the percentage of the population, which has tertiary 
qualifications (certificates). This segment of the population is likely to have 
particularly good chances of realising self-fulfilment, because with tertiary 
education, individuals not only acquire skills and knowledge to a high degree, 
but at the same time, they have also increasing chances of achieving a skilled 
job and an above average income on the labour market, that is, they achieve 
economic autonomy, too. 
On the other hand, we use as indicators the competence measurements according 
to PISA (comptetences). For this, we firstly take into account the average 
reading ability of 15 year old pupils. Through international studies coordinated 
by the OECD, comparative data on the performance of the education systems 
were obtained in very good quality. The scale used here from the PISA 2015 
represents the reading literacy, understood as the ability to understand written 
texts, to use and to reflect on them in order to achieve one's goals, to develop 
one’s knowledge and potential as well as to participate in society (see Prenzel et 
al. 2004: 20). The PISA tasks were not aimed at a school-based curriculum, 
instead everyday reading situations as well as the targeted application of reading 
skills in different contexts were focused on. Secondly, we consider the 
proportion of pupils with reading literacy at level 5 or above, to assess the 
“peak” in reading literacy (PISA 2015). 
Out of these four indicators, we form the additive index of “objective 
autonomy” in the sense of conditions for the actual use of the formal “freedom 
of choice”. 
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In order to determine the degree of freedom of choice, we consider as a further 
aspect, the subjective assessment of the freedom of choice, by the society 
members: “In this country, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your freedom to 
choose what you do with your life?” (Gallup 2015). 
Out of the index for “objective autonomy” and the indicator for “subjective 
autonomy”, we then form the overall index for autonomy with the same weight 
for the “objective” and the “subjective” autonomy. Altogether, the investments 
in education as well as the educational certificates and educational competences 
are used as indicators for the population’s capability through education as 
objective conditions for autonomy and the subjective assessment of the freedom 
of choice by the respondents in the various countries as “subjective autonomy”. 
 
Autonomy in country comparison 
The willingness to invest in education is most pronounced in the social 
democratic countries Denmark, Sweden and Finland, as well as in the UK and in 
Cyprus and Malta, which spend about 7-9 % of its GDP for education. Germany 
invests a total of 5,5 % of its GDP in education and is therefore only on 
place 24. At the end of the ranking one finds China and India as well as 
Romania. 
The highest population share with tertiary education is to be found in the 
economically liberal countries Canada and the USA, in the productivist 
countries Japan and South Korea as well as in Russia and Luxembourg. 
Germany ranks on place 27: only 27,1 % of Germans have a tertiary education 
qualification. The share of tertiary graduations is particularly low in the post-
socialist countries Romania and Serbia, in Italy and in Turkey, in the emerging 
markets of Brazil and South Africa as well as in China.  
The highest average reading competency is to be found in the productivist 
welfare regime of East Asia with its competitive education systems. Canada 
ranks at the top of the 43 countries considered, which is mainly due to the good 
integration of migrants. Finland ranks slightly behind Canada on place 2, 
probably because of its integrated school system with individual support, but 
also because of its low share of migrants, since children with a migration 
background are significantly worse off in Finland than the other children. With 
509 points the German 15-year-olds rank by now above the OECD average (493 
points in 2015). In the comparison of the states considered here, Germany has 
now improved to place 8. The worst average reading performances are to be 
found in Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, and at the very end in Brazil.  
Considering the top performers (with reading competency level 5 or above) the 
productivist welfare regime of East Asia ranks at the top with the highest mean 
share of such pupils. The economically liberal countries Canada and New 
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Zealand reach the first and third place at the “PISA top”, probably because of 
the good integration of migrants and their effective school systems. Finland also 
has an effective school system and reaches the second place, but the pupils with 
immigration background in Finland are much worse off than the other pupils; 
the share of these pupils is so small that this weakness has not so much weight. 
With 11,7 % of pupils with high reading competency Germany has improved 
strongly from place 14 in 2012 to place 7 (of 40 countries) in 2015. The smallest 
shares with higher reading competency are to be found in the post-socialist 
countries Romania and Serbia as well as at the very end in Turkey and in Brazil.  
When the four indicators are combined to an index for the objective 
prerequisites for autonomy, Canada is at the forefront of capabilities through 
educational investments and educational outcomes in the form of certificates and 
competencies. This is certainly due to the good integration of pupils with a 
migration background into the school system. Finland ranks second in objective 
capabilities for autonomy, but in Finland the competencies of pupils with a 
migration background and the other pupils are very different; this has no weight 
for the average, because there are only a few migrants in Finland. The 
productivist South Korea reaches third place with its competitive education 
system. Germany is in the midfield with place 17 of 43 countries. On the other 
hand, Romania and Turkey as well as the emerging markets of Brazil, India and 
China rank at the very end (with no PISA evaluations for India and China for the 
country as a whole).  
Considering the subjective assessment of the degree of freedom of choice 
(% satisfied with freedom to choose), the socio-democratic countries Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark and Finland, the economically liberal countries Australia and 
New Zealand as well as the conservative country Switzerland rank at the top. 
But with 90 % satisfaction Germany on place 12 also still belongs to the top 
group. Extremely low is the satisfaction in the crisis country Greece with 39 % 
of the population, which is the lowest value of all countries considered. 
Moreover, satisfaction with the freedom to choose is also comparatively very 
low in the post-socialist countries Serbia, Lithuania and Croatia as well as in 
Turkey. 
If the “objective autonomy”, i. e. the sub-index to the objective prerequisites for 
the capability to autonomy on the basis of educational investments and 
educational results, and the “subjective autonomy”, i. e. the subjective 
assessment of the freedom to choose of the populations in the various countries, 
are combined with equal weight in an overall index, the economically liberal 
countries Canada and New Zealand as well as the social democratic countries 
Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark rank at the top. With place 13 among 
43 countries, Germany by now belongs to the first third. Objective and 
subjective autonomy altogether are very poorly pronounced in Serbia, in Turkey 
and especially in the crisis country Greece.  
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On the development of the expenditures on education  
Predominantly, there is continuous rise in both absolute expenditures on 
education and in their proportion of GDP. 
According to Eurostat, the share of education expenditures of the front runner 
Denmark rose from 7,4 % in 2005 to 7,8 % in 2009. In Germany, the increase 
from 5,1 % in 2005 to 5,3 % in 2009 took place at a lower level. 
In the OECD countries, educational expenditures as a proportion of GDP rose 
from 2008 to the crisis year of 2009 on average from ca. 4,9 % to ca. 5,2 %, 
which should be in particular due to the fall in GDP, as the absolute 
expenditures on education cannot be changed so quickly. From 2010 to 
2012/2013, this share remained constant at about 5,2 percent, according to 
OECD 2016. 
 
On the development of tertiary education 
In the EU27 the share of the population (from 25 to 64 years) with tertiary 
qualifications has risen steadily from 22,5 % in 2005 to 29,3 % in 2014. In 
Germany the share rose from 24,6 % in 2005 to 27,1 % in 2014. 
In the OECD the share of the population (from 25 to 64 years) with tertiary 
qualifications rose from 26 % in 2005 to 34 % in 2014. In Canada, the leading 
country, the increase from 46 % in 2005 to 54 % in 2014 took place at the 
highest level. South Korea shows a particularly strong increase in the share of 
people with tertiary education degrees from 32 % in 2005 to 45 % in 2014, 
which fits into the systematic rise of South Korea through investments in 
education, research and development. 
 
On the development of the mean reading competency 
Canada is at the forefront in average reading competency. Already since 2000 
Canada belongs to the top, even if in the meantime it lost some performance 
points. This should be due to the fact that Canada is very successful at 
integrating children with a migration background into the school system.  
Finland, with its universalistic educational system, belongs to the top of the 
development of average reading competency from 2000 to 2015, even though it 
lost some performance points between 2000 and 2012, according to the PISA 
studies. In Finland, pupils with a migration background are significantly worse 
off than the rest, but this has not so much weight for the average, since there are 
only a few pupils with a migration background in Finland. 
The high priority of education in East Asia is demonstrated by the very good 
performance of Japan and South Korea. The productivist welfare regime is at the 
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top of the welfare regimes in terms of average reading competency. Compared 
to 2000, however, both countries lost some performance points by 2015. 
Germany has reacted to the below-average performance of the divided school 
system in 2000 with reforms, which point from a three-tiered into a two-tiered 
system and seek to compensate for disadvantages, in particular through 
additional language courses. As a result, both the “social inheritance” of the 
educational success rate and the average performance has been increased by 
2015, with improvements of the disadvantaged and constant accomplishments of 
the more privileged. 
 
On the development of the share of PISA top reading performers  
Canada, which is the front runner in this criterion in 2015, increased the share of 
pupils with high reading competency (level 5 or higher) from 12,8 % in 2009 to 
14,0 % in 2015. In Finland (place 2) the share of the top readers fell a little from 
14,5 % in 2009 to 13,7 % in 2015. 
Germany has improved its share of top readers from 7,6 % in 2009 to 11,7 % in 
2015. This means that Germany ranks on place 7 in 2015, in particular because 
it responded to the “PISA shock” of 2000 with stronger support for 
disadvantaged pupils.  
The competitive productivist welfare regime ranks at the top of the welfare 
regimes in the average share of top reading performers in 2015, with South 
Korea reaching place 4 and Japan place 11 among 40 countries. 
 
On the development of subjective autonomy 
In the subjective assessment of the degree of freedom of choice, the social 
democratic welfare regime ranks always at the top from 2007 to 2014, according 
to the Gallup data. From a population share of 94 % with subjective autonomy, 
this share drops slightly to 92 % in the crisis year of 2009, but is recovering 
again to 94 % by 2014. Since 2010, Norway has always been at the top with 95-
96 %. 
The economically liberal and conservative welfare regimes fell from a level of 
subjective autonomy of 88-89 % before the crisis to 87 % in the crisis year 2009, 
but recovered to a share of 89-90 % by 2014, which agreed with the extent of 
their freedom of choice. 
The extent of subjective autonomy is much lower in the other three welfare 
regimes. In the familistic welfare regime the population share with subjective 
autonomy declined from 76 % in 2007 to 69 % in the crisis year of 2009, but 
rose somewhat on average to 70 % by 2014. The extent of subjective autonomy 
in the productivist welfare regime decreased from 71 % in 2007 to 64 % in the 
crisis year of 2009, but recovered to 69 % by 2014. The average level of 
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subjective autonomy in the post-socialist country group decreased from 66 % in 
2007 to 60 % in the crisis year of 2009, but rose again to 68 % by 2014. 
As a single country, Greece is the most affected by the crises. In Greece the 
subjective autonomy fell from 58 % in 2007 to 44 % in the crisis year 2009; 
after a recovery to 53 % in 2011, however, with the euro crisis the subjective 
autonomy fell sharply back to 37 % in 2014. The latter is the lowest subjective 
assessment of the population among all 43 countries considered.  
 
Objective versus subjective autonomy  
If one confronts the objective and subjective autonomy (r = 0,62), the 
economically liberal countries Canada and New Zealand as well as the social 
democratic countries Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark are at the 
forefront. These countries rank at the top in both objective and subjective 
autonomy; they all have successful educational systems and are very positively 
evaluated by the population regarding freedom of choice. 
The total autonomy in Serbia and Turkey as well as in the crisis country Greece 
is particularly poor. In the latter case, the assessment of freedom of choice by 
the population is the worst among all countries. In productivist South Korea the 
objective skills are very strongly developed because of the competitive 
educational system, but the population’s assessment of freedom of choice ranges 
below the average. Conversely, e. g. in Malta, objective skills range below the 
average, but the subjective autonomy of the population in Malta with its 
growing standard of living belongs to the first third of the countries considered. 
In Germany, the results go into the same direction, only somewhat more 
favourably: with respect to the objective preconditions for freedom of choice, 
Germany ranges only in the middle with place 17, but in the subjective 
assessments of freedom of choice by the population, Germany is performing 
well with place 12, so that with place 13 in the overall index of objective and 
subjective autonomy it now belongs to the first third of the 43 countries 
considered. 
 
6. Prosperity after the global financial crisis, prosperity versus 
ecological sustainability, equality of participation  
 
Economic prosperity and economic growth are seen as worthwhile targets 
almost anywhere in the world. The social-democratic, the economically liberal 
and the conservative welfare regimes are, on a world scale, with regard to the 
level of prosperity on a very similar level at the top of welfare regimes (see 
chapter 6.1). 
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In the context of the global financial crisis, the familistic countries of Southern 
Europe have stagnated, and have thus staid behind compared to other countries, 
while the productivist countries of East Asia, especially South Korea, as well as 
China are among the most successful economic climbers in the context of the 
world financial crisis. The speculative business that led to the world financial 
crisis has thrown back the countries involved, while the emerging economies 
with their normal business models have at the same time relatively risen (see 
chapter 6.2). 
If the development of prosperity is designed with respect to ecological 
sustainability, the damages caused by economic growth can be minimized and 
the utility of prosperity can be increased. Humanity consumes more resources 
than nature can regenerate. Already today, a description of the climatic change is 
alarming. The consequences are manifold and serious. Obviously, the goal of 
establishing material prosperity at a high level collides in part with the claim of 
being ecologically sustainable. The wealthy states thus have a dual political need 
to attach greater weight to ecology. In the coming decades, they have to find 
exemplary ways to produce their prosperity through a reduced use of natural 
resources. If one compares the countries, the highest environmental impacts also 
take place from the wealthy countries (see chapter 6.3). 
The formal rights of freedom, which characterize democratic societies, in reality 
cannot be used by all citizens to the same amount; the exercise of civil and 
political freedom is linked to prerequisites and capabilities. Social rights, which 
guarantee a basic material supply, make possible a civil society that offers 
everyone the opportunity to participate. An adequate distribution of prosperity is 
intended to provide each actor with the material prerequisites so that he can 
participate in the social interactions as an equal participant. An exact 
equilibrium of material goods is not necessary for this, but inequality must not 
be so great that it prevents the possibility of equal participation in social 
interactions for some citizens (see chapter 6.4). 
 
6.1 Prosperity and growth: a comparison of countries and welfare regimes  
Prosperity as a socially desirable goal  
Economic prosperity and economic growth are seen as a worthwhile goal by the 
political authorities almost anywhere in the world, and not rarely, policy 
measures are tailored to the extent that they are beneficial to these goals. 
However, as for example Amartya Sen (2002, p. 25) argues, a good economic 
performance has no intrinsic moral value.  
The maximisation of the economic performance of a country is therefore not an 
end in itself, but only becomes a desirable goal through the derived values. 
These moral values, which are associated with economic prosperity, include, for 
example, a better supply of the citizens with public and private goods, and thus a 
higher material living standard, a weakening of conflicts about distribution, a 
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declining number of unemployed persons, and, last but not least, also an 
improvement of subjective well-being. The migration streams of this world 
process mainly towards higher prosperity and greater freedom.  
However, economic indicators, such as gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita, show only the average level of material well-being that is determined 
with respect to all individuals. It is desirable from a normative perspective to 
live in a society where people are doing well on average; however, the 
distribution of material wealth to individual actors or to certain population 
groups is not taken into account in such an aggregate value. From our point of 
view, therefore, it seems appropriate to regard the level of prosperity and growth 
on the one hand and, on the other hand, also to take into account how the 
prosperity is distributed among the population, when assessing the qualities of 
societies. 
 
Selection of indicators  
Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of the economic performance of an 
economy. GDP is the total value of all goods and services produced within one 
year and within a national economy for final consumption. For a country 
comparison, it is first necessary to make GDP relative to the population, and 
second, to consider the different price levels in the individual countries. The 
GDP is accordingly reported per capita and adjusted for purchasing power and 
inflation differences on the basis of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)3. The 
indicator represents the economic strength or the average material prosperity of 
a country. In addition to prosperity, the average growth rate of GDP is reported 
as a percentage of GDP over the period from 2006 to 2016 (status: October 
2016).4 The growth rate measures the change in GDP compared to the previous 
year. 
 
The standard of living in country comparison 
The international comparison shows that the greatest economic prosperity is to 
be found in the financial centre and city state of Luxembourg, which, however, 
is hardly comparable with state areas. With some distance, on the next rank one 
finds the economy of Ireland, which has well recovered from the financial crisis, 
and social democratic Norway. 
                                                 
3
 For the determination of the purchasing power parity, it is calculated how many units of each national 
 currency are necessary to buy a particular representative basket of goods that an actor could receive for 
 one US dollar in the USA. 
4
 The average growth rate for each country is calculated by the tenth root from the ratio of GDP 2016 to 
 GDP 2006. 
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The contrasts between the richest and the poorest countries in our selection are 
very strong. With place 9 Germany belongs to the first third of the countries and 
thus ranks slightly behind the Netherlands and Sweden. The economic 
disparities between the old and new federal states in Germany have not yet been 
completely overcome. 
The rise of the productivist South Korea is one of the strongest in the context of 
the global financial crisis and has now reached the level of prosperity directly 
behind Japan.  
Among the familistic countries Malta, with its low level of real taxation on 
foreign direct investment, coped by far best with the financial crisis, leaving all 
other familistic countries behind. Greece, on the other hand, proved to be little 
competitive in the stress tests through the global financial crisis and the euro 
crisis. 
The post-socialist countries are mainly placed at the end of the ranking, although 
there are large differences within this group, e. g. between the Czech Republic 
(place 23), Slovenia (place 24) and on the other hand Serbia (place 41).  
Among the BRICS countries, with respect to the standard of living Russia ranks 
ahead of China, Brazil, South Africa and finally India. India reaches less than 
half of the prosperity level of China (operationalised by the GDP per capita). 
The strongest economic growth is to be found in India and especially in China, 
which are developing the most dynamically. This has contributed to the 
weakening of the economic crisis following the global financial crisis. 
Due to its orientation towards the internal market, Poland has been relatively 
unaffected by the economic crises and, concerning economic growth over the 
past decade, ranks on third place behind China and India. Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania were hit particularly hard, during the crisis year of 2009, with their 
growth model, which was loan-financed in foreign currencies, but they also 
recovered as fast by means of rigorous restructuring measures. From the six 
welfare regimes considered, the group of post-socialist countries has grown the 
most strongly during the last decade with an average of 3,5 % per year, but still 
lags behind the other welfare regimes in its catching-up process with respect to 
the standard of living.  
South Korea is also pursuing its rise on the world market with success, which is 
why the productivist welfare regime ranks on second place with regard to 
economic growth over the past decade. 
From the economically liberal countries, during the last decade, Ireland has risen 
by far the most, with an average growth of 4,0 % per year, while the 
economically liberal welfare regime altogether rose with an average of 2,6 % 
per year. 
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Germany has grown by an average of 2,8 % per year in the last decade, by 
which it ranks on place 16. The group of conservative countries has a moderate 
average growth of 2,1 % per year in the last decade. 
The social democratic countries have, on the average, the highest standard of 
living; on the other hand, prosperity has grown only moderately in the last 
decade by an average of 1,6 % per year. In the last decade, Sweden rose with 
2,4 % per year just like the international average, but Norway, Finland and 
Denmark are only weak in economic growth with places 36, 39 and 40 among 
the 43 countries considered.  
Among the familistic countries, only Malta with an average growth of 4,1 % 
rose more strongly than the international average during the last decade. 
However, during the last decade the familistic welfare regime overall scores the 
worst in terms of economic growth, with an average of 1,2 % per year. In the 
last decade, Greece, which proved to be the least competitive in the stress tests 
through the global financial crisis and the euro crisis, was the only one of the 43 
countries considered to suffer a decline in the standard of living, namely with an 
average of 0,9 % per year. 
In economic growth, the initial level plays a major role. It appears to be easier to 
get a high rate of growth from a lower initial level. If a country has already 
reached a very high welfare level, it may be more difficult to achieve the same 
relative growth. Due to this basis effect the growth rate is also reported only in 
addition to the level of prosperity. As a Western European country, Ireland is a 
particularly interesting case. Before the financial crisis, the country has achieved 
unprecedented economic growth within approximately fifteen years and has 
transformed itself from a low income agrarian economy on the fringe of Europe 
into a modern economy, which now saw itself in a central position between the 
economies of North America and Europe. This growth process was abruptly 
interrupted by the banking crisis in Ireland. In the meantime, however, Ireland 
has already recovered very well and is even in second place among the 43 
countries considered, which is also due to the relocation of multinational 
companies. 
On country level, there is a highly significant correlation coefficient of r = -0,59 
(excluding the outlier Luxembourg) between the level of prosperity and the 
growth rate, which means that high relative growth is usually more difficult to 
achieve if the level of prosperity is already very high.  
The change in the level of economic prosperity from 2006 to 2016 shows that, 
for example, Ireland has recovered very well after a setback by the Irish banking 
crisis and now reaches second place in the standard of living. As an international 
financial centre, the city state of Luxembourg ranks at the top with some 
distance before Ireland and Norway with its oil wealth.  
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Germany improved from the 14th to the 9th place in the last decade, and is thus 
one of the top upwardly mobile countries with respect to the standard of living.  
In the global financial crisis and in the euro crisis, most countries in the south 
have fallen behind, Cyprus and Italy each by five places, Portugal by three 
places, and Greece descended most strongly in the last decade with a decline of 
eleven places due to its low competitiveness. On the other hand, Malta has risen 
by five places with its low level of real taxation of multinational corporations. 
With the productivist model of economic rise by technology-driven export 
successes on the global markets, South Korea ascended most strongly in the last 
decade, namely by nine places.  
In Eastern Europe there were also relatively strongly ascending countries by five 
places each, namely Poland with its orientation to domestic markets and 
Lithuania. 
China, with its high growth rates in the last decade, moved from the penultimate 
position of the 43 countries to the 39th before Serbia, South Africa and Brazil, 
while India remained in the last place, despite its notable growth. 
 
On the development of the standard of living 
Luxembourg as a city state is not so well to be compared with other states. As an 
international financial services centre, the standard of living (GDP per capita 
PPP) stands at the top of the countries considered. In the crisis year 2009 the 
GDP fell by 6,5 %, but this was compensated again by the end of 2012. Ireland, 
which currently holds second place in the standard of living, has experienced a 
spectacular ascent and descent as well as a revival. The rise of the “Celtic tiger” 
ended in the financial and banking crisis with a decline of the GDP by 4,9 % 
each in 2008 and 2009. The strong revival culminated in extreme growth rates of 
10,0 % in 2014 and 26,9 % in 2015, which is also due to the relocation of 
multinational companies. Norway, which is on third place, also has special 
conditions, since it also benefits from the natural oil wealth. In the crisis year 
2009 GDP declined by 2,0 %, but the economy grew again by 3,3 % in 2012. 
Switzerland, which ranks on fourth place, is one of the countries that came well 
through the crisis. Although GDP in Switzerland fell by 2,8 % in 2009, this was 
more than offset by growth rates of 3,0 %, 2,9 % and 1,9 % from 2010 to 2012. 
As the real cause of the global financial crisis, the USA (fifth place) has 
emerged relatively well from the crisis with flexible economic policy. After the 
slump of the GDP by 2,9 % in the crisis year 2009, GDP in the USA rose 
already again by 3,0 %, 2,9 % and 3,3 % from 2010 to 2012.  
Even in the crisis year 2009 China grew by 9,5 %, thereby contributing to the 
stabilisation of the global economy. In the following years 2010-2012, China 
also grew strongly by 11,4 %, 11,2 % and 9,3 %. India is still far behind in the 
average standard of living. However, in the crisis year 2009 it grew by 7,8 % 
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and also in 2010-2012 the growth was altogether strong with 10,0 %, 6,8 % and 
5,4 %.  
Since the reunification Germany ranked only at the end of the first third because 
of the not yet completed assimilations, but has by now advanced to the ninth 
place. Due to the very strong export dependency, Germany crashed strongly 
with 4,6 % in the crisis year 2009, but it did well with economic stimulus 
packages, short-term work and export successes in the recovery of the global 
economy with growth rates of 5,3 % and 7,7 % of the GDP in 2011 and 2012, 
respectively.  
 
6.2 The development of prosperity in the different welfare regimes 
The social democratic, the economically liberal, and the conservative welfare 
regime, which Esping-Andersen differentiates in his modern classic “The Three 
Worlds of World Warfare Capitalism” (1990), are at a very similar prosperity 
level. The social democratic welfare regime is slightly ahead, the economically 
liberal and the conservative a little behind it.  
In this prosperity process, the USA, the actual origin of the world financial 
crisis, as well as the economically liberal countries on the whole, performed 
somewhat better than the conservative countries on average.  
The productivist countries of Japan and, in particular, South Korea, belong to 
the most successful economic climbers in the world financial crisis and have left 
the familistic welfare regime behind with respect to average prosperity.  
The familistic countries of Southern Europe have stagnated on average, with 
Greece and – due to the commitment of the Cypriot banks in Greece – 
eventually also Cyprus have economically fallen behind.  
The post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe are on average in a moderate 
upward trend after the world financial crisis.  
The economy of Turkey has come relatively well through the world financial 
crisis, but the economic perspectives of Turkey are strongly dependent on the 
further political developments.  
The emerging markets of Brazil and South Africa are at a very similar level of 
prosperity and are currently rather stagnating.  
Besides the productivist countries, China is one of the economic climbers in the 
context of the world financial crisis and pursues economically a very stable 
growth path. Even in the general crisis year 2009, China still grew by about 9 %, 
thus contributing to the stabilisation of the global economy. – India finally starts 
with the lowest level of prosperity among the 43 countries considered. It also 
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shows high growth rates, but from a very low prosperity basis. Even in the crisis 
year 2009 economic growth in India was still about 7 %. 
Altogether, therefore, the familistic countries of Southern Europe have stagnated 
in the context of the world financial crisis, and thus have stayed behind with 
regard to the level of prosperity, while the productivist countries of East Asia, 
especially South Korea, and China are among the most successful economic 
climbers in the context of the world financial crisis.  
The speculative business that led to the world financial crisis has thrown back 
the countries involved, while the emerging economies have comparatively risen 
with their normal business models.  
The causes for the performance results in the economic management of the 
world financial crisis are manifold. In addition to basic investment in education, 
research and development as well as in infrastructure, competitiveness, export 
efficiency, gender equality and integration as well as social security systems 
play a role as stabilisers in addressing the challenges posed by economic crises. 
When the development of prosperity is designed in due consideration of 
environmental sustainability, the damages caused by economic growth can be 
minimised and the utility of prosperity can be increased. 
 
6.3 The downside of prosperity and growth: Ecological sustainability 
Ecological sustainability as a socially desirable goal 
Humanity consumes more resources than nature can regenerate – even though 
only a small proportion of the world population participates in the economic 
prosperity. In 1998 the richest fifth of the world's population consumed more 
than two thirds of the electricity provided and they held nearly nine out of ten 
cars in its possession (see UNDP 1998). If it were possible to transfer the 
material standard of living of the Western societies all over the world, this 
would go many times beyond the capacities of the biosphere to regenerate and 
lead to an ecological crisis of global dimensions. A catch-up development for 
the sake of justice would be "the mother of all disasters" (see Sachs 2004). 
Even today a description of the climatic change is alarming. In particular, the 
consumption of fossil fuels and the resulting emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
have become a global problem. The CO2 content in the atmosphere has risen by 
35 percent since the beginning of industrialisation, is currently on the highest 
level of past 650,000 years, and has increased further up to now in a still 
accelerating speed (see IPCC 2015). The consumption of natural resources grew 
steadily and with it also the overloading of the biosphere (since 2013 a 
stabilisation has become apparent). 
The consequences of CO2 emissions are numerous and severe. The years 1983 
to 2012 were the warmest 30 years over the last 800 years and a further warming 
of at least 1,8°C is projected for the current century. Thus, the snowy areas and 
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glaciers will melt, sea levels will rise, extreme weather, rainfall, droughts and 
heat waves will be accumulating. Even with an immediate stop of CO2 
emissions these developments would not entirely end (see IPCC 2015). 
At the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris in 2015 the Assembly decided 
to limit global warming to 1,5°C. However, there are no sanctions for non-
compliance with the agreed points.  
Apparently the goal of establishing material wealth at a high level all over the 
world collides partially with ecological sustainability. Sustainable development 
is defined as development that "meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to be able to meet their own 
needs" (WCED 1987: 8). The inter-generational equity demands that natural 
resources are not depleted by the current generation. This distributive justice 
also requires that natural resources and environmental pollution are not divided 
asymmetrically between rich and poor countries. 
The wealthy countries are thus in a double way politically in the duty to give  
ecology a higher weight. In the next few decades they need to find exemplary 
ways to significantly reduce the overuse of the natural environment and to 
produce their wealth by a lower use of natural resources. The wealthy countries 
are responsible for the highest pollution across the countries considered. There is 
a significant positive correlation (r = 0,57) between economic prosperity and 
CO2 emissions for the 43 countries in our analysis, among which some of the 
richest economically liberal states have particularly high CO2 emissions. 
Without the transition to a "resource-light style of prosperity" (Hawken et al. 
2000) the burden on future generations can be devastating, who then have to live 
with the problematic and potentially irreversible ecological changes. For such a 
transition especially three strategies are discussed: 
1. The efficiency strategy seeks to increase resource productivity, thus trying 
to make the production of goods gradually ecologically more efficient. 
Efforts here are directed to the reduction of the resources required per unit 
of production. In our empirical country comparison an indicator of energy 
efficiency is taken into account.  
2. A second strategy is the strategy of substitution by which one tries to 
replace fossil fuels by renewable energies in energy production. 
Compared to fossil fuels, renewable energies are less restricted and the 
risk to damage the natural environment is avoided. The substitution 
strategy, too, is taken into account in our empirical comparison with an 
indicator. 
3. The so-called strategy of sufficiency intends to decouple quality of life 
from economic growth. Quality of life not only depends on the material 
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wealth, but is also based on various non-monetary aspects. The 
sufficiency strategy aims at changing lifestyles as well as consumer and 
leisure behaviour of people to reach the result of an environmentally 
sustainable as well as a meaningful and valuable life for people. 
An adjacent term for sufficiency is the concept of consistency in the sense of 
production and consumption in accordance with the natural cycles. Our indicator 
of the proportion of organic agriculture in the whole agriculture stands for a 
“sufficient” life as well as one consistent with the natural cycles. This is an 
indication of the proximity of the two terms. If one takes non-renewable 
resources as an example of illustration: Efficiency means to use these resources 
(more) effectively. Substitution states that one replaces fossil resources by 
renewable ones. Sufficiency includes changing the way of life (production and 
consumption) so that the consumption of non-renewable energy is reduced or 
avoided. Ecological consistency states linguistically a production and 
consumption in accordance with the natural cycles. The extent of reduction and 
avoidance is not yet determined by this definition. The Research Institute of 
Organic Agriculture and the Federation IFOAM define organic agriculture by 
the four principles of health, ecology, fairness and care. The proportion of 
organic agriculture should be suitable as an indicator for both the general 
concept of sufficiency as well as for the general concept of consistency. On the 
basis of these measurements no country achieves a share of 20%, i.e. the respect 
for the principles of ecology – here for the example of agriculture – is still 
completely inadequate. Climate change is a definite alarm signal. 
 
Selection of indicators 
In order to detect ecological sustainability comprehensively, on the one hand 
indicators are reported that measure various environmental burdens, on the other 
hand indicators are used which quantify the extent of relief efforts being pursued 
by individual countries.  
As an indicator of ecological burden, we first report the CO2 emissions per 
capita. These emissions are considered the major cause of increasing global 
warming and climate change. Furthermore, the waste load per capita informs 
about the consumption of natural resources. Finally, we use the energy 
component which is generated by nuclear power. Nuclear energy not only raises 
again the question of technical controllability. In particular the environmental 
impact is further increased by the disposal of highly radioactive waste, and this 
for many future generations. 
As an indicator of ecological discharge we first consider energy efficiency. One 
way to achieve an environmentally sustainable form of economy is to use energy 
resources more efficiently through technical innovation. This approach aims at 
reducing the natural resources that are required for the production of certain 
goods steadily. The energy efficiency is measured by the GDP (PPP) which is 
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achieved per unit of fossil energy consumption (World Bank 2015). A country 
that manages to produce its economic prosperity with the least possible 
consumption of fossil fuels (i. e. from the limited fossil fuels such as oil) would 
do well in this indicator. Unlike fossil fuels renewable energy sources have 
virtually no limits of supply. Sun, wind, geothermal energy and water power can 
be regarded as practically inexhaustible source of energy that also ecosystems 
with less strain than e. g. coal power plants.5 The substitution of fossil fuels by 
renewable energy sources is an effective sustainability strategy. Therefore, the 
proportion of total energy consumption of a country, which is currently covered 
by renewable energy sources, is selected as a second indicator. Third, we 
measure the strategy of sufficiency by the share of agriculture which is 
environmentally sustainable farming. This indicator represents a very basic 
strategy by which a precautionary prevention of environmental damage can be 
achieved. 
 
Model with differentiation of levels of ecological burden and relief efforts 
(Dieter Holtmann) 
In order to assess the extent to which a society is designed in consideration of 
ecological sustainability I propose to distinguish between indicators of 
ecological burden and indicators for the relief efforts. The aspects of the levels 
of burden and the relief efforts can vary logically independently and empirically 
they do. A partial conflict of goals then exists, more specifically, between the 
standard of living (e. g. in the form of consumption) and the ecological burden. 
To illustrate the analytical distinction between these two dimensions I propose a 
two-dimensional representation of the level of ecological burden vs. relief 
efforts. It is an empirical question to what extent individual societies respect 
these aspects. 
 
Comparison of countries 
As expected, the countries which comparatively have a low level of prosperity 
also burden the environment less. This again illustrates the conflict between the 
socially desirable goals of prosperity and environmental sustainability. 
In particular the less developed countries India, Brazil, the post-socialist 
countries Latvia, Romania, Lithuania and Turkey thus have the lowest CO2 
emissions. On the other hand, the city state of Luxembourg and the 
                                                 
5
 However, it is to be considered that the natural conditions in some countries can facilitate energy 
 production from renewable energy sources. Iceland, e. g. wins by favourable natural conditions, to 
 cover the entire demand for electricity by water power and geothermal energy. This performance would 
 not be possible under other natural boundary conditions. 
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economically liberal countries Australia, USA and Canada have the highest CO2 
emissions per capita. Germany is only ranked 33rd of the 43 countries. 
The less economically developed countries such as India and China as well as 
Brazil and poorer post-socialist countries such as Romania are also have the 
least amount of waste per inhabitant and thus rank at the top. On the other hand, 
the rich economically liberal countries Canada, USA and Australia, but also 
Denmark, Switzerland and the city state Luxembourg have the highest amount 
of waste. With the 34th place Germany belongs to the last third of 42 countries. 
There is a whole series of countries that completely renounce nuclear power. 
After the nuclear disaster in Japan in 2011 it is one of those countries since 
2014, but the further development is still open. France holds the highest nuclear 
share which currently covers 76,9 % of its energy needs. Slovakia and Hungary 
also have high nuclear energy shares, namely more than 50%. Germany with its 
26th place of 43 countries ranks at the end of the midfield. 
When we now sum up all these ecological burdens in a sub-index for the level of 
these ecological stresses, the following picture results: besides the poorer 
emerging countries of India, China and Brazil the ecological burden is also low 
in Latvia. The economically liberal countries USA, Canada and Australia with 
its pure focus on growth as well as the city state of Luxembourg and France 
(with its nuclear energy) pollute the environment comparatively the most. With 
the 34th place Germany belongs to the last third of the countries. 
The extent to which ecological relief strategies are pursued also varies greatly 
between countries. The economically most efficient use of primary energy can 
be determined for Malta, Switzerland and Ireland. Germany (rank 14) has a 
relatively efficient use of primary energy, too. With considerable distance 
Russia can be found at the end of the ranking, which discloses a careless use of 
the abundant fossil energy. Russia spends about four times as much primary 
energy – compared to Ireland – to produce the same amount of economic 
prosperity. 
Norway holds with clear distance the highest amount of energy from renewable 
energy sources, in particular the water power is used intensively. In the top 
group Norway is followed by the social democratic countries Sweden and 
Finland as well as Brazil, Latvia and New Zealand. Germany holds a share of 
energy from renewable energy sources of 13,8% and thus ranks on the 24th 
place of 43 countries. At the end of the ranking we find the East Asian countries 
South Korea and Japan as well as Russia with its abundance of fossil fuels and 
Luxembourg as city state. 
In sustainable agriculture Austria as well as Estonia and Sweden are at the top. 
In Germany (rank 14) the agriculture is managed in ecological sustainability in 
only about 6% of the whole area. In quite a lot of countries the proportion is 
even close to zero, for example, in all BRICS countries that fully focus its 
priority on economic growth. 
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The sub-index relief strategies is led by the conservative countries Austria and 
Switzerland, as well as the social-democratic countries Sweden and Norway and 
also Latvia. Germany ranks on the 17th position. The economically liberal 
countries Canada and the United States as well as the growth-oriented countries 
of China and South Korea, South Africa and finally Russia rank at the very end. 
Russia does not take care of its environment probably because of its mineral 
wealth. It is striking that the United States ranks at the 39th place, though it 
would obviously have the know-how for further relief efforts. 
In the overall index of environmental sustainability, which is calculated as the 
average of the standardised partial indices for the level of ecological burden and 
the ecological relief efforts, Latvia is leading because it belongs to the top in 
both sub-indices. Latvia is followed by Austria, Norway and Sweden due to 
their strong relief efforts as well as by India and Brazil because of their low 
ecological burdens (see also figure 6-14). Germany (place 31), with an index 
value of -0,39, ranks below the average of the 43 countries. The economically 
liberal countries USA, Canada and Australia as well as the resource-rich Russia 
show the worst results.  
On the one hand, the USA and Canada pollute their environment most heavily; 
on the other hand, Russia has the least relief efforts. 
 
Level of ecological burden and relief efforts 
The juxtaposition of the level of ecological burden and the relief efforts shows 
that there tends to be at least four concise ecological regimes: prosperous 
countries, which have an average level of ecological burden, but pronounced 
environmental consciousness, which is reflected by strong relief efforts, for 
example, Austria as well as the social-democratic countries Sweden and 
Norway. 
Brazil belongs to the countries with an above-average level of ecological 
burden, but also above-average relief efforts. Latvia is the well-balanced 
combination in between, since the level of ecological burden is lower than in 
Austria and the relief efforts are higher than in Brazil. That is why Latvia is at 
the forefront of all considered 43 countries in the overall index of ecological 
sustainability. 
The economically liberal countries USA, Canada and Australia are prosperous 
and have a very high level of ecological burden, at the same time the relief 
efforts rank below average – this is the most unfavourable combination. Russia 
is only slightly different, since with less prosperity it also has a slightly lower 
level of ecological burden, but the relief efforts are also even lower than in the 
economically liberal countries. Finally, there are countries with below average 
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prosperity and level of ecological burden, but in which the ecological 
consciousness also ranks below average. For this China is a relevant example 
because this observation per capita has to be weighted by the population which 
in China is by far the highest. That is why every change in China would have a 
high impact on the overall state of ecological sustainability. 
 
On the development of CO2 emissions 
In the countries with the lowest CO2 emissions per capita – that is, in the 
emerging countries India and Brazil – these emissions increase from 2006 to 
2013, in India from 1,02 to 1,49 and in Brazil from 1,67 to 2,26. An upward 
adjustment is of course undesirable. And the populous countries of India and 
Brazil carry weight. China, which also preponderates, is on place 21 (of 43) and 
has worsened from 4,49 to 6,60 in similar relation like India. The city-state of 
Luxembourg with the highest emissions per capita has improved from 2006 to 
2013 by about 25%. The economically liberal countries USA, Australia and 
Canada, which carry more weight, have reduced their emissions from an 
unfavourably high level by about 5 to 10%. Although Germany has reduced its 
emissions from 2006 to 2013 by about 5%, it currently only reaches place 29 (of 
43 countries). Altogether the CO2 emissions have been reduced in the OECD 
from 2006 to 2013 by about 10 %.  
 
On the development of the waste pollution 
India has by far the lowest waste pollution, there is no information on its 
development. In China the waste pollution increased (according to OECD) from 
92 kg per capita in 2000 to 116 in 2009, so it ranks on place 2. In Brazil the 
waste pollution fell from 336 in 2000 to 295 in 2012, thus reaching place 3. At 
the very end we find Canada and the USA. In the US the waste pollution has 
decreased from 783 kg in 2000 to 725 in 2012. Canada, which produces the 
most waste, does not report any time series. Germany currently ranks on 
place 34 (of 42). In Germany the waste pollution decreased (according to 
Eurostat) from 642 kg in 2000 to 582 in 2007, but then increased again to 617 in 
2013. In the EU27, the average waste pollution dropped from 523 kg per capita 
in 2000 to 481 in 2013, since the reduction is a political goal. In the OECD as a 
whole, the waste pollution decreased from 560 in 2000 to 522 in 2013. So there 
is a general trend to reduce waste pollution. Germany is no example of best 
practice. 
 
On the development of the use of nuclear energy 
France uses the risk technology of nuclear power by far the most. While this is 
historically understandable, it is nevertheless not reasonable. France reduced the 
nuclear share of electricity production from 78,0 % in 2002 a little to 76,9 % in 
2014. Slovakia, ahead of France on the second to last place, reduced the nuclear 
share from 65,4 % in 2002 to 56,8 % in 2014. Hungary on the other hand, which 
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is on the third place from bottom, has increased the nuclear share from 36,1 % in 
2002 to 53,6 % in 2014. Germany has reduced the nuclear share from 29,9 % in 
2002 to 15,8 % in 2014, and ranks on place 26. Japan has reduced the nuclear 
share from 34,3 % in 2002 after the nuclear disaster in 2011 to 0 % in 2014, 
though at the moment it is unclear whether the current government is running up 
the nuclear capacity again. After all, 20 of the countries considered renounce 
entirely the risk technology nuclear power. 
The nuclear disaster in Japan in March 2011 resulted only in Japan and 
Germany in a significant decline of nuclear energy. In Germany in the late 
1990s a gradual phasing out of nuclear energy had been decided by the red-
green coalition. In 2009 this decision was withdrawn by the CDU/CSU-FDP 
coalition and the run durations were extended. Prior to the elections in Baden-
Württemberg in autumn 2011 after the nuclear disaster in Japan the CDU/CSU 
was threatened by severe losses of voters in favour of the Greens. The 
chancellor Angela Merkel changed the campaign by promising to shut down all 
17 nuclear power plants in Germany by the year 2022. The increase in votes of 
the Greens at the expense of the CDU/CSU was not stopped nevertheless. 
 
On the development of energy efficiency 
The first aspect of the relief efforts is the issue of efficiency. The GDP of a 
country shall be produced with the least possible expenditure of energy. 
According to the World Bank the ratio of GDP per primary energy consumption 
is the biggest and best in Malta, Switzerland and Ireland. Malta has improved 
the value from 12,63 in 2006 to 17,68 in 2012. Switzerland increased the value 
from14,59 in 2006 to 16.65 in 2013. Ireland increased the value from 14,41 in 
2006 to 15,33 in 2013. Russia on the other hand applies its abundant energy 
least efficiently. Russia increased the value only slightly from 4,19 in 2006 to 
4,41 in 2013. This means that Russia currently needs about four times as much 
primary energy per unit of GDP as Malta. Germany reaches place 14 (of 43 
countries), the value of energy efficiency was improved from 9,36 in 2006 to 
11,07 in 2013. 
 
On the development of the share of renewable energy 
Norway, which by far leads in renewable energies, has increased the share of 
renewables in gross final consumption (according to Eurostat 2015) from 58,6 % 
in 2004 to 69,2 % in 2013. Sweden increased this share from 38,3 % in 2004 to 
52,6 % in 2013, and thus ranks on place 2. Brazil stagnated with its share of 
renewable energy (according to OECD 2015 for "energy supply") between 
42,3 % in 2004 and 42,7 % in 2011. These three countries are at the forefront of 
the 43 countries considered. On the other hand, in Russia and South Korea 
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renewable energy is hardly used. Germany has risen the share of renewables in 
gross final consumption (according to Eurostat 2015) from 5,8 % in 2004 to 
13,8 % in 2013 – Norway has more than five times the German share and 
Sweden about four times – and thus ranks on place 24 (of 43 countries). The 
EU28 has increased this share from 8,3 % in 2004 to 15,0 % in 2013, this being 
a relatively continuous course. 
 
On the development of the share of organic agriculture 
Austria has increased the proportion of organic agriculture (according to FiBL 
2016) from 16,7 % in 2005 to 19,4 % in 2014 and thus clearly ranges at the top. 
In Austria the ecological cultivation is supported by an environmental program 
in the agricultural sector. The greater range of organic products also meets a 
growing demand. Estonia has increased this share from 7,2 % in 2005 to 16,5 % 
in 2014 and ranks on place 2, followed by Sweden, which has improved this 
share from 7,0 % in 2004 to 16,4 % in 2014 , On the other hand, the BRICS 
countries South Africa (about 0 %), Russia (0,1 %), Brazil (0,3 %), China 
(0,4 %) and India (0,4 %) currently have a very low awareness regarding 
ecological sustainability in agriculture. Germany has increased the proportion of 
organic agriculture from 4,7 % in 2005 to 6,3 % in 2014 and thus ranks on place 
14 (of 43 countries). 
 
6.4 Social equality: Income (in)equality as well as poverty in education and 
income in the comparison of countries and welfare regimes  
Social equality as prerequisite for civil rights and as a socially desirable 
goal  
The formal rights of citizens, which characterise democratic societies, cannot be 
used by all citizens to the same extent in reality; the realisation of civil and 
political rights is subject to conditions and capabilities. This applies even more 
when a positive concept of freedom is claimed. If the concept of freedom does 
not only mean the absence of coercion, but also includes the capacity of being 
able to do what one has decided voluntarily. The conditions of civil liberties and 
rights include personal capabilities as well as financial resources. Workers who 
are every day completely absorbed by the struggle for survival no longer have 
time to participate as active citizens in politics and community. Without 
resources political and civil rights have no “real” value; they remain purely 
formal. Without the social rights, which guarantee a basic material supply, a 
civil society, that offers opportunities for participation for all, cannot be made 
possible.  
In order to guarantee the factual liberties of all citizens permanently, according 
to John Rawls (2003) a society must have institutions that steadily ensure fair 
conditions for the operations of the actors. For this it is necessary to adjust the 
distribution of valuable resources time and time again. If the empirical 
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distribution structure is not adequately regulated and adjusted, the first just 
social process would spontaneously increasingly slip into the unjust, no matter 
how free and fair the individual interactions may seem. In an unregulated free 
market system oligopolistic accumulations would profit, which would lead to 
stabilisation of unjustified inequalities and restrictions of fair chances. 
Nancy Fraser (2003), too, defends a conception of justice that values equality 
and equal opportunities. A desirable distribution of material goods and wealth 
shall provide the material conditions to every actor to enable them to participate 
as an equal in social interaction. For that an exact uniform distribution of 
material goods is not needed, however, the inequality must not become so great 
that it prevents the chance of equal participation in social interactions for some 
citizens.  
 
Selection of indicators  
Poverty means that either the material conditions or the personal qualifications 
are missing to really take advantage of certain fundamental freedoms of society. 
Therefore, the right not to have to live in poverty becomes a fundamental right 
in affluent societies. The rate of poverty indicates the share of the population, 
which does not have the material conditions necessary to effectively make use of 
the liberty rights of a society. In general, persons were defined as poor when 
they lived in households that had less than 50 percent of the median income. 
With this indicator one does not measure absolute poverty, but the relative 
disadvantage in comparison to the median income. Since the EU by now works 
with the 60 %-threshold (risk of poverty), it is also used here. Another relevant 
indicator is the Gini coefficient, which measures the concentration of income. 
This coefficient indicates how unequally income is distributed in a population. 
The lower the Gini coefficient, the more egalitarian is the distribution of 
income; the higher the coefficient, the more the income is concentrated in the 
hands of few people.6 The coefficient is regularly used for international 
comparisons. 
However, the use of individual liberties is equally linked to capabilities, i. e. 
primarily to education. In order to measure educational poverty, in turn, two 
indicators are applied. By the share of early school leavers one understands the 
proportion among the 18- to 24-year-old people who have no or only a low 
educational certificate7 and who actually do not attend a training at any kind of 
                                                 
6 
 A Gini index with the value of 0 expresses that every citizen and every household has exactly the same 
income (maximum equality); a Gini index with the value of 100 expresses that the total income is possessed 
by one single person or one single household (maximum inequality, see Holtmann 2009, p. 68 f.). 
7
 
 
 All certificates up to ISCED 3c level are counted as low educational attainment.  
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school. Because of their low formal educational attainment these young adults 
thus begin their careers with unfavourable conditions. The second indicator does 
not refer to educational certificates, but to competences that are acquired in the 
school system. As part of the PISA studies, international comparative data on 
the performance of education systems were obtained in very good quality. The 
target population for the PISA studies are the 15-year-old pupils of a country. 
The scale used here from PISA 2015 represents the reading competence, 
understood as the ability to understand written texts, to use and to reflect on 
them in order to achieve one’s goals, to develop one’s knowledge and potential 
and to participate in society (see Prenzel et al. 2004: 20). The indicator describes 
the percentage of 15-year-old pupils in a country that can solve even the 
simplest PISA tasks only with difficulties. Since this low reading performance 
does not fulfil the requirements of a knowledge society, these young people 
were defined as “risk readers” by the PISA authors.8 
 
Social equality in country comparison  
The comparison of countries shows that in educational poverty as well as in 
income poverty and inequality there is a high degree of dispersion among the 
countries considered. 
With a small amount of 3-5 % early school leavers, the post-socialist countries 
Croatia and Slovenia together with Switzerland rank at the top. (The low 
certificate poverty is to be qualified in the case of Croatia and Switzerland, since 
in these countries one finds ca. 20 % pupils with poverty in reading performance 
in terms of PISA.) Germany with 10,1 % has already around twice as high a 
proportion of early school leavers, so Germany ranks on place 16 of 31 
countries. In the Southern European countries Portugal, Italy, Malta and Spain 
as well as in the post-socialist countries Bulgaria and Romania the proportion of 
early school leavers ranges from 13 % to 20 % and finally in Turkey at 36 %. 
The share of pupils with poor literacy (“risk readers” in the sense of PISA) is the 
lowest in 2015 on the average in the productivist welfare regime. In the two 
productivist countries Japan (with 12,9 %) and South Korea (with 13,7 %), the 
share of “risk readers” is comparatively low. The economically liberal countries 
Ireland (1st place) and Canada (3rd place) as well as Estonia (2nd place) and the 
social democratic Finland (4th place) are even more successful in limiting the 
risk of poor literacy. In Germany, there is a higher proportion with low reading 
competences (16,2 %), which places Germany in 11th place (from 40 countries). 
Germany, however, reduced this share from 22,6 % in 2000 by 6,4 percentage 
points. Germany has reacted relatively successfully to the PISA evaluations of 
2000, especially with improvements in the support of disadvantaged pupils. 
                                                 
8  
  The reading performance can be divided into five levels of competency. The competency level 5 represents a 
high level of expertise in dealing with texts and level 1 describes only elementary reading skills. All those 
pupils, who reached at most proficiency level 1, were defined as “risk group”. 
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Romania and Bulgaria as well as Turkey have about 40 % “risk readers”. Behind 
one finds only Brazil with about 50 % pupils with poor literacy. 
If one measures the educational poverty by an equally weighted index of 
certificate and competence poverty, the productivist countries Japan and South 
Korea as well as Canada and Ireland rank at the top. Turkey and Brazil range by 
far at the end. Germany with place 19 among 40 countries belongs to the 
midfield. 
The relative (income) poverty is defined as the percentage of the population 
which has an income below 50 % of the median income. The EU by now works 
with the 60 %-threshold (risk of poverty), so it is used here, too. The lowest risk 
of poverty (with 10-13 %) is to be found in the post-socialist countries the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, in the social-democratic countries Norway, Denmark 
and Finland as well as in the Netherlands. Germany ranks with 16,7 % on place 
18 (of 39 countries). The highest degree of relative poverty can be found in the 
post-socialist countries Serbia (25,4 %) and Romania (25,3 %), in the 
economically liberal USA (24,2 %) as well as in Turkey (23.7 %).  
To study income inequality the Gini coefficient is well suited (1 = maximum 
concentration, 0 = minimum concentration). The most egalitarian are the social 
democratic countries Norway (.235), Sweden (.254) and Finland (.256), the 
post-socialist countries Slovenia (.250), Czech Republic (.251) and Slovakia 
(.261) as well as the conservative countries Belgium (.259) and the Netherlands 
(.262). Considering the inequality of income distribution, Germany ranks on 
place 18 of 43 countries with a Gini coefficient of .307. Among the developed 
countries the economically liberal USA is the country with the greatest income 
inequality (.401). The same degree of inequality is to be found in post-socialist 
Russia (.396). The “Communist” China exhibits even greater income inequality 
(.410), in particular because of the large urban-rural differences. Turkey ranges 
even behind (.428). The most extreme inequality can be found in the emerging 
nations Brazil (.550) and South Africa (.700). 
If one forms a sub-index for equality of participation at income out of the 
standardised poverty rate and the standardised Gini coefficient, the social 
democratic countries Norway, Finland, Denmark and Sweden, the Netherlands, 
as well as the post-socialist countries Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia 
rank at the top. Germany with place 18 among 43 countries belongs to the upper 
midfield. The inequality of participation at income is the largest in China, in the 
post-socialist countries Russia, Romania and Serbia, in the economically liberal 
USA and in Turkey, as well as finally in Brazil and South Africa at the very end. 
In the overall index of equality of participation in education and income, the 
social democratic countries Norway, Finland and Denmark as well as the post-
socialist countries Czech Republic and Slovenia are at the forefront. With the 
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18th place among 43 countries, Germany is in the upper midfield. The greatest 
inequality of participation in education and income is to be found in Turkey as 
well as particularly in the emerging markets of Brazil and South Africa.  
 
Educational poverty versus income poverty 
The relationship between educational and income poverty (indicators: “risk 
readers” versus (income) poverty) yields a two-dimensional view, in which the 
countries’ specific profiles are clearly visible: the social democratic countries 
Norway, Finland and Denmark show both low educational poverty and low 
income poverty.  
The productivist countries South Korea and Japan are emphatically fighting 
educational poverty, but they are more likely to transfer the responsibility for 
income poverty to the individuals and the families. The economically liberal 
countries Canada, USA, Australia and New Zealand also tend in this direction. 
Catholic Malta, on the other hand, is not very successful in limiting educational 
poverty, but protects the population more from income poverty since the 
Socialist phase. The economic latecomers Romania and Bulgaria cannot protect 
their populations sufficiently either from educational poverty or from income 
poverty. 
Investments in education for precaution as well as spending by the welfare state 
in the case of risk events pay off: investments in education limit the number of 
risk readers (partial proof: r = -0,29; S = 0,07) and favour low income poverty 
(r = -0,52; S = 0,00) and a good result in the overall equality of participation 
(r = 0,32; S = 0,04). 
Expenditures of the welfare state in the case of risk events reduce income 
poverty (r = -0,46, S = 0,00), reduce income inequality (r = -0,49; S = 0,00) and 
contribute to the overall equality of participation (r = 0,44; S = 0,00). 
 
On the development of the share of early school leavers 
In the EU27 the share of early school leavers (aged 18 to 24) declined 
continuously from 17,6 % in 2000 via 15,8 % in 2005 to 11,0 % in 2015, 
according to Eurostat 2016. It is a strength of the post-socialist countries to leave 
behind only few with a low educational certificate. The new EU member Croatia 
(since July 2013 as extension to the EU28) reduced its share of early school 
leavers from 5,1 % in 2005 to 2,8 % in 2015 and thus ranks at the top. Slovenia 
as the second best has a share of 5,0 % in 2015. However, the PISA results show 
a more critical picture because, according to the competence measurements, 
Croatia with 20 % has a remarkable amount of risk readers. The Czech Republic 
has 22 % risk readers, although only 6 % have a low school leaving certificate.  
However, in some countries of Southern Europe the problems are even greater. 
In Malta, the share of early school leavers was lowered from 38,9 % in 2005 to 
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still 19,8 % in 2015. In Spain the share of early school leavers was reduced from 
30,8 % in 2005 to still 20,0 % in 2015. Finally, in Turkey this share decreased 
from 48,8 % in 2006 to still very high 38,3 % in 2015. So especially in Southern 
Europe there is a great need for action with regard to the empowerment of young 
people. 
Germany also improved, but at a less favourable level from 13,5 % in 2005 to 
10,1 % in 2015 (place 20 of 40 countries). 
 
On the development of the share of “risk readers” 
Of the post-socialist countries, which have a particularly low level of certificate 
poverty, Croatia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and especially Slovakia have 
20 % or more risk readers in 2015, according to PISA, which relativises the 
successes in limiting certificate poverty.  
With 13,3 % the productivist welfare regime has the lowest mean share of risk 
readers. However, this share has worsened in Japan (from 9,8 % in 2012 to 
12,9 % in 2015) as well as in South Korea (from 7,6 % in 2012 to 13,7 % in 
2015). As a single economically liberal countries Canada (slightly improved 
from 10,9 % in 2012 to 10,7 % in 2015) and Ireland (slightly worsened from 
9,6 % to 10,2 %) rank ahead on places 3 and 1. The social democratic welfare 
regime as a whole is on second place in the share of risk readers, somewhat 
before the economically liberal welfare regime. Finland improved slightly from 
11,3 % in 2012 to 11,1 % in 2015 and ranks on fourth place. 
Brazil ranks at the very end with 51 % risk readers in 2012 and 2015. But also 
the socio-economic latecomers Bulgaria and Romania perform very poorly with 
about 40 % risk readers. 
Germany has improved compared to the below-average result in 2000 and ranks 
above the OECD average in 2012 and 2015, due to the increased support for 
disadvantaged pupils: the share of risk readers fell from 22,6 % in 2000 to 
22,3 % in 2003, 20,0 % in 2006 and 18,5 % in 2009 to 14.,5 % in 2012 and 
slightly increased to 16,2 % in 2015 (place 11 of 40 countries). 
 
On the development of relative (income) poverty 
According to Eurostat 2016 (SILC) the EU27 has initially improved in the share 
of people at risk of poverty, that is with less than 60 % of the national median 
income, from 16,4 % in 2005 to 16,3 % in 2009, but after the financial crisis the 
risk of poverty has increased again to 17,2 % in 2014.  
Although in the Czech Republic the risk of poverty, after a decline from 10,4 % 
in 2005 to 8,6 % in 2009, rose again to 9,7 % in 2014, it reached the best value 
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from all countries considered. Norway, where the risk of poverty was finally 
reduced from 11,4 % in 2005 to 10,9 % in 2014, ranks on the second place. 
In Germany, the risk of poverty has risen steadily since 2005, namely from 
12,2 % in 2005 to 16,7 % in 2014, which is no good development. 
According to the OECD 2016, in the economically liberal USA the risk of 
poverty, after 23,8 % in 2006, ranges at 24,2 % in 2014, which is the highest 
poverty rate in the developed countries. 
 
On the development of income inequality  
In the EU27, income inequality (measured by the concentration coefficient of 
Gini) has remained roughly constant from 2005 to 2011, with a value of 30,9 % 
in 2014 (see Eurostat 2016, SILC).  
Norway has reduced the income inequality from 28,2 % (Gini) to 23,5 %, and is 
now at the top. Even though Slovenia and the Czech Republic have deteriorated 
somewhat in recent years, they exhibit, together with Norway, the lowest 
income inequality.  
Germany initially improved in income inequality from 30,4 % in 2007 to 28,3 % 
in 2012, but since then income inequality has risen again to 30,7 % in 2014 (see 
Eurostat 2016, SILC). 
According to OECD 2016, income inequality in the United States increased to 
40,1 % in 2013. In Russia income inequality is similar in size, with 39,6 %. 
About 2010, income inequality in China ranges at 41,0 % and finally in the 
countries with the greatest income inequality at 55,0 % in Brazil and at 70,0 % 
in South Africa.  
 
On the development of income poverty and educational poverty altogether 
The share of risk readers (as an indicator of educational poverty) remained 
relatively constant in the OECD average from 2000 to 2015 at around 20 %. 
Germany has improved continuously from an unfavourable level (22,6 %), 
particularly by supporting disadvantaged pupils, and with 16,2 % is now 
performing better than the OECD average (according to PISA 2015). 
On the other hand, the share of (relative) income poverty in the EU27 rose from 
16,4 % in 2005 to 17,2 % in 2014. In Germany, the (relative) poverty rate rose 
from 12,2 % in 2005 to 16,7 % in 2014 (see Eurostat 2016, SILC), which is not 
a good development.  
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7. The womenfriendliness of countries and welfare regimes in an 
empirical comparison  
 
Appreciation of peculiarities: womenfriendliness as desirable societal goal  
Compared to men, women face disadvantages in their life practice; they are 
affected as a group by social inequality. Social inequality refers to the 
systematic unequal distribution of valuable resources. Social inequality between 
the sexes can be reflected in the underrepresented of women compared to men 
on universities, in parliaments or in management positions or when receiving a 
lower income. Ultimately, those numbers reflect hierarchical gender relations; 
women have less economic independence and lower life chances. 
Since a few years women have been acquiring, on average, higher levels of 
education than men in many countries. If one would strive for the target of strict 
equality, one would dislike the high ratios of women graduating from university, 
which in many countries range considerably over 50 %. But, as long as women 
are still significantly disadvantaged in many other areas of society, woman 
friendliness appears to us as the appropriate socially desirable goal. Therefore, 
high shares of women in tertiary education are evaluated positively in terms of 
womenfriendliness. 
The mechanisms that lead to discrimination of women are often not easy to 
identify. Often the labelling of gender roles is accompanied by very subtle and 
covert forms of discrimination. The following factors are viewed as main 
barriers to greater success of women: the pronounced responsibility of women 
for children and family as well as the related less distinctive professional 
orientation, gender-structured labour markets with typical "women's jobs" as 
well as patriarchal structures in companies. There are also cultural stereotypes 
that associate the male gender more than the feminine gender with attributes 
beneficial to careers (strong leadership, rational, self-conscious, etc.). 
In the following, by womenfriendliness we understand the special promotion of 
women in welfare regimes, in particular the alignment of their conditions of 
access to resources that are generally estimated as valuable. The prevention of 
discrimination in a society is considered as a goal, the realisation of which 
modern societies should strive for. Therefore, different countries and welfare 
regimes are compared with respect to the extent in which they realise an anti-
discrimination and women-friendly society. 
 
Selection of indicators  
The degree of social discrimination against women can be assessed on several 
dimensions; the most important dimensions seem to be their participation in 
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political decision-making, their access to higher education and their participation 
in the labour market and wages. 
Access to high social and political offices is recognised as an important step 
towards more equality between the sexes. Through those offices decision-
making power is gained, and the potential to shape social structures. In order to 
measure the representation of the sexes in political offices, the share of women 
in the national parliaments is considered (lower or single house). 
In modern societies the educational system has a status assigning function. 
Social positions, social ascents and descents as well as occupation and career 
depend relatively closely on the educational level of a person. One indicator of 
the educational participation of women is the share of female students in the 
tertiary education (ISCED 6-7) according to UNESCO. If the shares of female 
students are particularly high, this will be evaluated positively in terms of 
womenfriendliness. 
Better educational qualifications of women did not lead to improving their 
chances in the labour market to the same degree. So there are still gender-
specific labour markets, women are more often than men employed below their 
level of education and they are also paid less. To measure the integration into 
the labour market, we consider the ratio of the employment rate of women 
relative to that of men. So high ratio values correspond to women-friendly 
labour markets. 
The income is a relatively good indicator to measure the living standards of 
people. A lower income of women implies less economic independence. As an 
indicator of income inequality between the sexes the average annual income of 
women in relation to that of men was chosen.  
To get a comprehensive value, which reflects the extent of discrimination 
against women in all four dimensions, the four indicators have been standardised 
and their average value is calculated as overall index for womenfriendliness. 
This total value thus represents all four aspects with equal weight. 
 
Relations between the indicators 
In countries where women are better represented in the parliaments, the labour 
markets are more open to women. Where women participate more effectively in 
the educational system, they also have a greater access to employment and the 
pay gap is smaller. In countries where women participate better at paid work, 
there is also a lower pay gap of women.   
 
Comparison between the countries 
The social-democratic countries Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark as well 
as the conservative countries Belgium and the Netherlands, but also South 
Africa achieve the best values with shares of women in parliament of 37 % to 
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44 %. The women-friendly welfare regime of Scandinavia reaches the best 
representation of women in parliament of all welfare regimes. India, Hungary, 
Brazil and finally Japan range at the very end; in these countries about ten men 
stand against one woman in the parliament. In Germany, the proportion of 
women is 36,5 %, so that Germany reaches place 10 among the 43 countries 
considered. 
In 36 of 42 countries considered the enrollment of women in tertiary institutions 
is now higher than that of men. In the social-democratic countries Sweden and 
Norway as well as in the post-socialist countries Slovenia, Slovakia and Poland 
women outweigh the men most strongly. These two welfare regimes also on 
average perform the best in the educational participation of women. On the other 
hand, in tertiary education women participate the least in South Korea and Japan 
as well as India at the very end. Germany ranks behind Switzerland and ahead of 
Turkey at the fifth last place out of 42 countries.  
In contrast to the educational participation, women are still worse off than men 
in the labour market, which is illustrated by the activity rates. Relatively the 
highest female participation is to be found in the social-democratic countries 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland as well as in the economically liberal 
countries Canada and New Zealand. Concerning the employment rate of women 
the social-democratic welfare regime of Scandinavia ranks by far at the top. On 
the other hand, the female employment rate in India is only about 34 % of that 
of men, in Turkey about 41 % and in Malta 57 %. In Germany the female 
employment rate is about 81 % of the employment rate of men, so that Germany 
is on place 20 of the 43 countries considered. 
The average income yields a similar picture. While the average income of 
women in the social democratic countries Denmark, Sweden and Norway is 
103 %, 79 % and 78 % of that of men, in Catholic Malta it is only 42 %, in the 
Islamic influenced Turkey only 39 % and in Hindu dominated India only 24 %. 
In addition to the countries of the social-democratic welfare regime, which ranks 
by far at the top, Australia and Slovenia perform well, too. Germany reaches 
place 19 in the gender equality of income. 
The overall ranking, composed of the four indicators with the same weight, is 
led by the four social-democratic countries Denmark, Sweden, Norway and 
Finland as well as Slovenia and Australia. The strongest disadvantage for 
women exists in the East Asian countries Japan and South Korea as well as in 
Turkey and particularly in India. Concerning womenfriendliness Germany ranks 
in midfield; it is due to the relatively high percentage of women in parliament 
that the German overall value is not less favourable than place 24 among the 43 
countries considered. Comparing the four dimensions of participation, it stands 
out that in the more traditional societies the participation of women in the 
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political sphere is particularly low, with shares of approximately 10 % in the 
parliaments. 
 
On the development of womenfriendliness                                                   
On the development of the share of women in parliament  
Concerning the participation of women in parliament, the social-democratic 
countries Sweden and Finland rank continuously at the top. In 2006 the share of 
women in parliament was 47,3 % in Sweden and slightly declined to 43,6 % by 
2015 (see World Bank 2016). In Finland the proportion of women increased 
from 38,0 % in 2006 to 41,5 % in 2015. The social-democratic welfare regimes 
clearly rank at the top of all welfare regimes, followed by the conservative 
welfare regime. 
In Germany the proportion of women in parliament has increased from 31,6 % 
in 2006 to 36,5 % by 2015, so that Germany reaches place 10 out of the 43 
countries. 
In Confucian Japan at the very end the proportion of women in parliament 
stagnated from 9,4 % in 2006 to 9,5 % in 2015. The machismo of Brazil is 
reflected in the proportion of women in parliament, which, after 8,8 % in 2006, 
is 9,9 % in 2015. In Hungary the proportion of women declined from 10,4 % in 
2006 to 10,1 % in 2015. Concerning gender equality India is another 
problematic case, the proportion of women in parliament has increased only 
slightly from 8,3 % in 2006 to 12,0 % in 2015. That is, eight men in parliament 
stand against one woman. Even in the USA the share of women has risen only 
from 16,3 % in 2006 to 19,4 % in 2015. That is, in the USA five men in 
parliament stand against one woman. While women in educational institutions 
on average catch on and overtake already, this development is obviously on 
delay in politics. So it is still justified to consider womenfriendliness as a 
socially desirable goal. 
 
On the development of the share of women in tertiary education  
Concerning the participation of women in tertiary education (ISCED 6-7) the 
social-democratic countries Sweden and Norway perform the best. In Sweden 
the share of women among the students (according to Unesco 2015) increased 
slightly from 60,6 % in 2006 to 61,0 % in 2013, which is the top of all 43 
countries considered. In Norway the share of women among students rose 
slightly from 60,1 % in 2006 to 61,4 % in 2013. Similarly well is the 
performance of the post-socialist countries Slovenia, Slovakia and Poland in 
tertiary education. 
The lowest share of women in tertiary education is to be found in Turkey, Japan 
and South Korea as well as, at the very end, in India. In Turkey the share of 
women among students has slightly increased from 43,1 % in 2006 to 45,6 % in 
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2013. In Japan the share of women among students has increased a little from 
41,1 % in 2006 to 42,8 % in 2012. In South Korea the share of women among 
students has slightly increased from 37,1 % in 2006 to 40,1 % in 2013. In India 
the share of women among students has increased slightly from 38,7 % in 2001 
to 40,0 % in 2010. However, India and South Korea still rank at the very end. 
In Germany the share of women among students stagnates with 47,74 % in 2006 
and 47,67 % in 2013. From the viewpoint of womenfriendliness – because 
women still form an overall disadvantaged group – in Germany the share of 
women in tertiary education ranks only on place 38 among 42 countries, so it 
belongs to the worst five countries. 
 
On the development of the ratio of female to male employment rates 
The social-democratic countries Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland rank at 
the top concerning the female employment quotient (see World Bank 2016). In 
Norway women's employment ratio increased from 85,8 % in 2006 to 89,3 % 
for 2014. That is, the female employment rate is 89,3 % of the male employment 
rate. In Sweden women's employment ratio rose from 87,1 % in 2006 to 88,7 % 
in 2014. In Denmark the ratio increased from 85,5 % in 2006 to 88,5 % in 2014. 
And in Finland female employment ratio grew from 86,8 % in 2006 to 87,0 % in 
2014.  
In India, women's employment ratio dropped from 42,4 % in 2006 to 33,8 % in 
2014, so that India ranks at the very end. In Turkey women's employment ratio 
increased from 33,9 % in 2006 to 41,4 % in 2014, so that Turkey ranges on 
second to last place of the 43 countries considered. 
In Germany female employment ratio increased from 77,2 % in 2006 to 80,9 % 
in 2014. That is, the female employment rate is currently about 80 % of the male 
employment rate. Germany thus ranks on place 20 of 43 countries, therefore in 
the midfield. 
 
On the development of gender equality of income 
According to the World Gender Gap Report 2014, the social-democratic 
countries Denmark, Sweden and Norway as well as Australia and Slovenia have 
the lowest gender pay gaps. In Denmark, Sweden and Norway the pay gap 
decreased slightly from 2006 to 2014 according to Eurostat. Slovenia is even 
more successful at the reduction of the pay gap, according to Eurostat. In 
Australia the pay gap remains rather constant from 2000 to 2013, according to 
the OECD.  
In South Korea, which has a very high pay gap, this gap decreased only slightly 
from 2000 to 2014, according to the OECD. (For Turkey and India, which also 
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have a high pay gap, there are no time series by which one might analyse the 
development.) 
On the whole, in the EU27 on average there is a slight drop in the pay gap from 
2006 to 2014, according to Eurostat. This also holds true for Germany, 
according to Eurostat. 
 
Conclusion 
In the participation of women in parliament, Germany performs relatively well 
with place 10 among 43 countries. Concerning the employment ratio in 
Germany with place 20 out of 43 countries ranks in the midfield. In gender 
income equality, Germany reaches place 19. But concerning the share of women 
among students, it ranks only on place 38 of the 42 countries considered. On the 
overall index of womenfriendliness Germany reaches place 24 out of the 43 
countries under consideration. That is, Germany ranges in the international 
average. 
 
8. Migrant-friendliness as well as the social integration of the 
whole population 
 
Because of the growing importance of migration, it is examined how successful 
the 43 countries considered are in the recognition and anti-discrimination of 
migrants (see chapter 9.1). In order to be able to compare the quality of life in 
the countries and welfare regimes considered, we use the amount of the social 
integration of the entire population (see chapter 9.2) as a performance criterion 
by means of integration into paid employment (“having”) and into the support 
networks (“loving”) as well as into participation in civil society ("being"). 
 
8.1 Appreciation of peculiarities: friendliness towards migrants in different 
countries and welfare regimes 
Appreciation of peculiarities: friendliness towards migrants as a socially 
desirable goal  
Not only the prevention of discrimination against migrants is a general objective 
of liberal societies, but also – formulated positively – the economic, social and 
political integration of people with immigrant backgrounds. This shall be 
achieved by granting equal rights and equal participation opportunities, for 
example in the education system and on the labour market. In fact, however, in 
many societies, there still are obstacles and barriers preventing adequate 
participation of migrants in public and political life and depriving this group of 
people of rights and resources. For this reason we can speak also of social 
discrimination: a person can be a victim of discrimination because of their 
individual peculiarities, but especially because they are recognisable as a 
member of a particular social group. Victims of discrimination must have 
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characteristics that make them distinguishable, e. g. certain physical features 
such as skin colour or language. Through these perceptible differences, they 
become the addressees of discriminating acts, disadvantages and prejudices. The 
effects of such systematic discrimination can be statistically described, e. g. as 
the under-representation of migrants in professional management positions or in 
higher education. It should be undisputed that all forms of discrimination are a 
violation of equality and freedom rights, as laid down in the constitutions of 
modern democracies.  
As the US-American racism research (e. g. Knowles and Prewitt 1969) showed, 
deprivation in one area of society spills over to other areas: the poorly educated 
immigrant finds on average only poorly paid work, living in ghettoised 
neighbourhoods in poor health conditions and passes this low social status on to 
his children, in the form of bad start conditions. The causes of the deprivation of 
migrants can be hidden in institutional structures and routines or can result from 
hidden or openly shown xenophobic attitudes of the majority society. 
Sometimes causes of a lack of integration can also be found among the migrants 
themselves, e. g. in the form of lack of language skills. The public discussion 
moves in the tension between demands for a complete cultural assimilation and 
claims for the appreciation of different cultural traditions and peculiarities. In 
the following, countries and welfare regimes now are compared with regard to 
what extent, firstly, they let migrants in and, secondly, they let admitted 
migrants participate in society.  
From 2015 on there was a strong inflow of refugees. In 2015 nearly 1,3 million 
asylum seekers came to Europe according to OECD 2016. Because of the 
conflicts about 25 % of the applicants came from Syria and about 16 % came 
from Afghanistan. 
Germany registered 440 000 asylum applications in 2015 and more than one 
million pre-registrations. Sweden received most of the asylum applications in 
relation to its population (1,6 %). 
 
Selection of indicators 
The following international comparison tries to exhibit the extent of societal 
discrimination against migrants by means of selected indicators. 
The extent of the migrant-friendliness shall be considered in two dimensions: 
openness towards migration (taking in migrants) and the participation of the 
migrants. The degree of openness of a society for migration will be measured by 
two indicators: the share of migrants in the total population and the rate of 
naturalisation. The share of migrants alone is certainly not a measure of the 
quality of integration, however, for the openness of a society. Of course it is 
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more difficult to integrate a large number of migrants, it is therefore appropriate 
to examine the quality of integration in a country also against the background of 
the quantity of migration into this country. 
With respect to the participation of the migrants we investigate, whether a 
society provides participation of the migrants in important areas. This will be 
measured here on the basis of the participation of the migrants in the 
employment and in the education system. The integration into the labour market 
is determined by the ratio of the unemployment rate of foreign-born and the 
unemployment rate of people born in the country. A value less than 1 indicates 
that the migrants even do better on the labour market. A value as of 2, on the 
other hand, would mean that the unemployment rate of migrants is twice as high 
as the unemployment rate of people born in the country. 
The measurement of the integration into the education systems is based on the 
data from the OECD, which has been collected as part of the Programme of 
International Student Assessment (PISA). A migrant background is attributed to 
students in the PISA studies, when they migrated together with their foreign-
born parents or when they are domestically born children of two foreign-born 
parents. As indicator for the educational integration, the mean difference of 
reading performance between migrant children and native children from PISA 
2015 will be considered. Here, the two group-means on the reading performance 
scale are compared directly. The indicator shows not only the actual 
performance differences, but refers implicitly to future inequalities, since 
educational competences shape the political, economic, social and cultural 
opportunities for participation. The educational competences – as basic 
preconditions for the participation in the information society, for lifelong 
learning and for individual self-realisation – are  crucial resources for success in 
life. 
 
Friendliness towards migrants in country comparison  
The classic immigrant countries Australia, New Zealand and Canada as well as 
the relatively small countries Switzerland and especially Luxembourg have the 
largest share of migrants in the total population. For a small country regional 
mobility is more likely to lead to migration than in a larger country. 
Nevertheless, it is a merit to include migrants, since, of course, the question of 
integration arises. In all five countries, the share of migrants is more than 20 % 
of the population, according to UN 2016. Countries with a very low proportion 
of migrants are China, where only one in every thousand is born abroad, as well 
as India and Brazil with less than 0,5 % of migrants. In the post-socialist 
countries Romania, Bulgaria and Poland there is a share of migrants of only 
about 1 % and in the productivist countries Japan and South Korea only about 
2 %, which is also comparatively very low. In Germany the share of migrants 
(according to UN 2016) is 14,9 % of the population, which means that Germany 
now ranks on place 11 out of 43 countries.  
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The generosity of naturalisations is another indicator of the openness of societies 
for migration. Societies like Australia and New Zealand do not think in the 
categories of citizenship, so there is only information about foreign-born vs. 
native-born population. Of the classical immigrant countries with high 
proportions of migrants, Canada (where more than 20 % of the population are 
migrants) is the most open to grant citizenship (per foreign population). Sweden 
has strongly improved in terms of openness in recent years, from a country with 
a low population of migrants to a society with a slightly above-average reception 
of migrants (about 15 % of the population). In the process of naturalisation of 
applicants (or here because of the availability of the data per foreign 
population), Sweden by now belongs to the top (2nd place). Poland and Hungary 
exhibit also a lot of naturalisation, but they do not want to admit refugees. While 
ca. 6 % of the concerned group (foreign-population) is naturalised in Canada 
and Sweden, these are only about 0,7 % in the Baltic States and Austria, and 
only about 0,4 % in Slovakia and Japan. According to OECD 2016, in Germany 
about 1,4 % of the concerned group get the citizenship, so Germany ranks on 
place 22 out of 34 countries. 
If one forms out of the two individual indicators an index of the society’s 
openness for migrants, the following results are obtained: the classic 
immigration countries Australia, Canada and New Zealand as well as the 
relatively small countries of Luxembourg and Switzerland rank at the top with 
regard to openness for migrants. Sweden has caught up with this top group in 
the last decade. Russia admits many returnees from the former Soviet Union, 
which here is not considered as genuine naturalisation. The least openness for 
migrants is to be found in China, India and Brazil, in the productivist countries 
Japan and South Korea as well as in the post-socialist countries Slovakia, 
Lithuania, Czech Republic and Bulgaria. Germany ranks on place 22 out of 43 
countries. 
In the classical immigration countries Australia, New Zealand and the USA the 
learning processes in the context of the integration of migrants have been 
developing continuously for a long time, and their well-designed immigration 
policies – also according to local needs – lead to the fact that the unemployment 
rates of foreign-born and native-born largely coincide (see OECD 2016). The 
conservative and social democratic countries are particularly bad at integrating 
migrants into the labour market. In the social democratic countries Norway and 
Sweden the unemployment rates of foreign-born are three times higher than 
those for native-born, in Denmark and Finland they are about twice as high. In 
the conservative countries Belgium, Switzerland and Austria the unemployment 
rates of the foreign-born are more than twice as high as those of the native-born. 
In Germany, the ratio of unemployment rates from foreign-born to native-born is 
1,87. Thus Germany ranges on place 24 out of 33 countries.  
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The classical immigration countries Australia (about 28% migrants), Canada 
(about 22% migrants) and New Zealand (about 23% migrants) belong to the top 
with regard to the reading competence of pupils with a migration background 
(PISA: both parents are migrants). This also applies to Ireland and Malta. In 
Hungary, pupils with a migration background perform also relatively well 
relative to the other pupils. However, in Hungary there are only about 5% 
migrants. 
As a weakness of the social-democratic countries Finland, Sweden and Denmark 
emerges that young people with an immigration background are not yet 
sufficiently integrated in the education system in the culturally relatively 
homogenous societies of Scandinavia. The conservative countries of Austria, 
Belgium, France and Switzerland, which all have hierarchical education 
systems, also perform poorly in the reading competence of pupils with a 
migration background. With place 33 among 37 countries Japan ranges even 
behind. 
With place 27 among 36 countries, Germany belongs only to the last third, but 
Germany has more strongly improved since PISA 2000 than the OECD average. 
From the two individual indicators a subindex of the equality of participation 
can be built. The economically liberal countries Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand are at the forefront. At the end of the ranking one finds the four 
Scandinavian countries, which are only beginning to develop an immigration 
tradition, as well as the conservative countries Belgium, Austria and 
Switzerland. Germany also belongs to the last third with place 27 among 37 
countries. 
If the two standardized subindices of openness for and participation of migrants 
are combined into an overall index, this gives an overview of how well 
individual countries succeed in admitting and integrating migrants. In this 
comparison, the economically liberal, English-speaking countries Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand reach the top positions. These countries are classical 
immigration countries, which have already learned to deal with and integrate 
migrants for a long time and have corresponding experiences. With place 28 
among 43 countries, Germany can still learn a lot from the classical immigration 
countries with regard to the openness for migrants and the participation of the 
migrants admitted. Brazil, China and India, as well as Japan, occupy the last 
places in migrant-friendliness, since they hardly admit migrants. The countries, 
that admit few migrants, in general also provide little information, so the data 
base is weak. 
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Model with distinction of openness towards migrants and participation of 
the migrants: migration regimes 
The traditional migration countries Australia (about 28 % migrants), Canada 
(about 22 % migrants) and New Zealand (about 23 % migrants), which have 
already for a long time continuously developed the learning processes around 
migration, also perform well in the participation of the migrants in the 
educational system and on the labour market. 
The social-democratic countries of Scandinavia, which are especially successful 
in the other socially desirable aims, were traditionally ethnically and culturally 
relatively homogeneous and have not yet developed enough experiences with 
migrants. Finland and Denmark admit few migrants and the admitted migrants 
are not doing well on the labour market and in the educational system. However, 
Sweden has been struggling for a number of years to improve its legal 
framework and has already admitted more migrants, so that the admission of 
migrants by now stands above the international average. However, the 
participation of the migrants in the labour market and in the educational system 
remains relatively poor. 
In small countries such as Luxembourg and Switzerland, regional mobility leads 
more easily to migration than in large countries. Accordingly, Luxembourg and 
Switzerland admit a relatively large proportion of migrants. But in these two 
conservative countries the relative participation of migrants in the educational 
system and in the labour market lie below the international average. 
Germany is somewhat stronger in the admission of migrants than in the 
participation of the migrants, but it ranges in both dimensions – that is, the 
openness towards and the relative participation of the migrants – below the 
international average. 
 
On the development of the share of migrants 
In the countries, which rank at the top, the share of migrants (measured by the 
percentage of foreign-born according to OECD 2016) has risen continuously: in 
the small countries Luxembourg from 35,0 % in 2004 to 45,3 % in 2014 and in 
Switzerland from 23,5 % in 2004 to 28,8 % in 2014. In the classical immigration 
countries Australia from 23,8 % in 2004 to 28,1 % in 2014, in New Zealand 
from 19,5 % in 2014 to 23,3 % in 2014 and in Canada from 18,4 % in 2004 to 
20,1 % in 2014. 
On the other hand, there are virtually no migrants in the post-socialist countries 
Romania, Poland and Bulgaria as well as in the East Asian countries Japan and 
South Korea (from 0,1 % to a maximum of 2,9 % of the population). 
Germany performs well in the reception of migrants with 14,9 % migrants 
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(place 11 of 43 according to UN 2016) after the comprehensive reception of 
refugees in 2015, but less well with regard to the other three indicators. 
 
On the development of naturalisations 
Canada and Sweden are the countries which simultaneously admit many 
migrants and have relatively many naturalisations per concerned group. In 
Canada (migrant share 20,7 %), the rate of naturalisation (according to OECD 
2016) was maintained at a comparatively high level of 11,5 % between 2004 and 
2011, but the level then was lowered to 5,9 % in 2012 up to 2014. In Sweden 
(migrant share 14,3 %), the rate of naturalisation increased from 6,1 % in 2004 
to 10,7 % in 2006 and, after a fall to 5,3 % in 2009, finally to 6,3 % in 2014. In 
this combination Canada and Sweden perform the best. 
On the other hand, Slovakia, the Baltic countries with their Russian minorities as 
well as Japan and even Austria rarely admit naturalisations (at most 0,8 %). 
In Germany, the number of naturalisations in relation to the foreign population 
is 1,4 %, according to OECD 2016. Thus, Germany ranks on place 22 among the 
34 countries considered. In Germany, the rate of naturalisation remained 
relatively constant from 2004 to 2014, whereas in Austria it declined sharply 
from 5,5 % in 2004 to 0,7 % in 2014.  
 
On the development of the unemployment of migrants  
Among the countries, which admit many migrants, in the USA, Australia and 
New Zealand there are hardly any differences in the unemployment rate of 
foreign-born and native-born. In the USA, the ratio of the unemployment rate of 
the foreign-born to that of the native-born remained constant at 0,98 (2008 and 
2012, respectively), i. e. was almost equal to 1, which means equal treatment. 
By 2015 the ratio in the USA even improved to 0,89. In Australia the ratio 
improved from 1,10 in 2008 to 1,01 in 2015. And in New Zealand, there was 
also a strong adjustment with a reduction of the ratio from 1,15 in 2008 to 1,00 
in 2015. 
On the other hand, the ratio in conservative Belgium deteriorated from 2,47 in 
2008 to 2,86 in 2012, i. e. in the economic crisis the inequality increased, so that 
the unemployment rate of the foreign-born is almost three times that of the 
native-born. By 2015, the ratio in Belgium fell to 2,49, i. e. roughly to the initial 
level of 2008. In the social democratic countries Norway and Sweden, the 
inequality also increased in the crisis: in Norway, the ratio rose from 2,30 in 
2008 to 2,52 in 2012. With the increase in migration, in Norway the quotient of 
the disadvantage of migrants increased again to 3,07. In Sweden, the ratio 
increased from 2,30 in 2008 to 2,48 in 2012. With the increase in migration, in 
Sweden the disadvantage of the foreign-born increased once again to 2,94 by 
2015. 
In Germany, the ratio of the unemployment rate of the foreign-born to that of the 
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native-born improved slightly from 1,84 in 2008 to 1,74 in 2012, according to 
OECD 2016. With the increase in migration the disadvantage of the migrants on 
the labour market in Germany rose to 1,87 by 2015, i. e. roughly to the level of 
2008. Hence, the unemployment rate of the foreign-born is currently almost 
double the unemployment rate of the native-born. Therefore, Germany achieves 
only place 24 among 33 countries.  
 
On the development of the difference in competencies  
Of the countries, that admit many migrants, the classic immigrant countries  
Australia, Canada and New Zealand rank at the top with their small differences 
between native pupils and pupils with a migration background (at PISA: both 
parents are migrants) in reading competency according to PISA 2015.  Canada 
even improved significantly between 2006 and 2015.  
Particularly large differences in literacy are to be found in the social-democratic 
countries Finland and Sweden, where the participation of migrants is one of the 
weaknesses. Finland worsened by 24 points between 2006 and 2015 and Sweden 
by 14 points, while the OECD average improved by 8 points. 
Germany improved from 2006 to 2015, the differences between pupils without 
and with migration background decreased by 19 points. The pupils without a 
migration background improved their reading competencies from 2006 to 2015 
by 16 points, and the students with a migration background improved even more 
strongly by 35 points, by stronger support. Germany ranges on place 27 among 
36 countries with regard to the differences in literacy between pupils with and 
without migration and thus belongs to the last third. 
 
Conclusion 
Regarding migrant-friendliness, I distinguish the openness towards the 
admission of migrants and the participation of the migrants. With regard to the 
openness to migration, Germany still ranks quite well with place 11 among 43 
countries, but when it comes to naturalization, Germany ranges only on place 22 
among 34 countries. 
In terms of the difference between the unemployment rates of "native-born" and 
"foreign-born", Germany ranges on place 24 among 33 countries.  Concerning 
the difference in the reading competences of pupils with and without a migration 
background, Germany lies on place 27 among 36 countries. 
Overall, Germany with place 27 among 43 countries in the overall index of 
migrant-friendliness, can still learn from the classical immigration countries 
with regard to the openness for migration and the participation of migrants 
admitted. 
76 
 
 
8.2 The amount of social integration in different countries and welfare        
regimes 
Social integration as a socially desirable goal  
Between the actors in social systems there are various relations that are 
expressed in many different acts of communication and interaction. Actors who 
are strongly involved in these relationships and communication networks can be 
considered as socially integrated. Social integration then refers to the processes 
and mechanisms by which the various actors are involved in the social system. 
From a macro sociological perspective, from these countless individual 
interactions results the basis for social cohesion, social solidarity and stability of 
a society. – Emile Durkheim was one of the great theoreticians of social 
integration, according to his theory social integration protects against anomy. 
Social integration itself can be described as a multidimensional phenomenon, in 
the terminology of Allardt (1993) one could distinguish between having, loving, 
and being. On the one hand, the actors can be integrated by the market into the 
society. By inclusion in the employment systems and the associated earnings 
members of the society are basically capable to participate in the consumer and 
leisure facilities (having). Secondly, social integration particularly takes place in 
the private or personal space, where each actor can find security and support in 
close kinship and friendship relations (loving). Thirdly, social integration also 
occurs in the civil society, particularly through voluntary associations such as 
civic associations, parties and unions. Ideally, these voluntary associations are 
open and inclusive, where actors with similar interests come together (being). 
Social integration should indisputably be regarded as a socially desirable goal 
because of these positive individual and societal effects. For some time, 
however, in the discussion of social integration increasingly the problems are 
emphasised. By Ulrich Beck (1986) an erosion of social ties and ways of life of 
industrial society is stated. The lifestyles of society members who are mobile, 
flexible and interested in personal self-fulfilment can be increasingly determined 
by their own freedom of choice and decisions, according to Beck. Under these 
circumstances, social ties become more fragile because they lose their long-term 
nature. The integration benefits of civil society are in erosion, according to 
Robert Putnam (1995, 2001). Putnam recognises at least in the United States a 
loss of social cohesiveness and a decline of civic engagement, which can e. g. be 
seen in the decline of the number of club memberships or rarer contacts to 
friends or neighbours. Because of these presumed crisis tendencies concerning 
social cohesion of modern societies, it seems particularly relevant to analyse 
social integration achievements in the economic, personal and civic sphere in the 
countries compared. 
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Selection of indicators  
The performance in social integration is measured by a total of seven indicators. 
Economic integration into the market society (having) is captured by the 
following two indicators. The employment rate is the proportion of working full- 
or part-time people of all persons of working age. The age range between 15 and 
64 years is defined as economically capable age. The unemployment rate is the 
proportion of persons unemployed in relation to the total workforce. Persons 
count as unemployed if they do not exercise gainful employment, but are 
registered as seeking work. Both indicators show the degree of economic 
integration. The participation in the employment system is important because it 
determines the financial possibilities of leading a life and helps to recognition 
and reputation. At the same time, contacts and friendships arise beyond 
professional interactions. In summary, the sub-index of economic integration is 
formed out of the standardised employment rate and the standardised 
unemployment rate with equal weight, and then standardised itself.  
Social integration in the narrower sense in the micro range of personal 
relationships is determined by the extent of personal support networks (loving). 
First, the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS 2012) raised the proportion of 
respondents who can expect help in the case of depression, whether from family 
members, friends, neighbours, colleagues, etc. This is in our opinion an indicator 
of social integration in the narrow sense, namely, the integration in the field of 
personal relationships. As a second indicator it has been asked, which proportion 
of respondents in a country in case of problems has family members or friends, 
on whom they can count (Gallup). Since the data of Gallup fluctuate relatively 
strongly with the annual samples, we have robustified the latest data (2011-14) 
by averaging to achieve a more stable data base. Out of the two standardised 
indicators for the personal relationships of EQLS and Gallup the sub-index for 
personal integration is built with the same weight. The sub-index itself is in turn 
standardised. 
The integration in the civil society and the participation in the formulation of 
socially important conditions (being) can be seen in the willingness of people to 
attend political events, to participate in socially important voluntary associations 
and to express their views against public officials. The participation in parties 
and unions are particularly important as these are prime opportunities to take 
part in shaping the social framework. As first indicator it was surveyed, 
participated as a high which proportion of respondents in a country attended in 
the last year a meeting of a trade union, of a political party or of a citizens’ 
initiative (EQLS). As a second indicator it was asked which proportion of the 
population has contacted a public official or politician. On the one hand, in its 
global survey Gallup inquired which proportion of the population voiced their 
opinion to a public official in the past month. Since the data of Gallup fluctuates 
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relatively strongly with the annual samples, we robustify the latest figures 
(2011-13) by averaging to obtain a more stable data base. On the other hand, in 
the European survey EQLS the proportion of the population that contacted a 
politician or public official is recorded similarly. From the two surveys by 
Gallup and by EQLS the sub-index “contacting politicians” is formed out of the 
two standardised partial indicators with equal weight. This sub-index is in turn 
standardised. As a third indicator it was raised, which percentage of persons are 
members of a trade union (OECD). As a summary out of the three standardised 
indicators for a civil society with equal weight, the sub-index for the integration 
in the civil society is formed. The sub-index is in turn standardised.  
Out of the three sub-indices for having, loving, being (Allardt 1993), an overall 
index is finally formed in which all three aspects – economic integration, 
personal integration and integration in the civil society – are incorporated with 
the same weight, i. e., a third each. The overall index is calculated as the 
arithmetic mean of the three standardised sub-indices and then in turn 
standardised.  
 
Comparison of countries  
In Switzerland, 80,2 % of people of working age (for comparison: 15-64) belong 
to the labour force (the currently unemployed are included herein). Almost as 
many are to be found in the social democratic countries Sweden (75,5 %) and 
Norway (74,8 %). These countries belong to the top group in realising the 
potential labour force. – On the other hand, in Serbia there are only 43 %, in 
South Africa only 44 % and in Turkey 50 %, in the traditional Southern 
European countries Greece (51 %), Italy (56 %) and Spain (58 %) we find less 
than 60 % of population of working age (see OECD 2016 and Eurostat 2016). – 
In Germany the employment rate rose from 65,8 % in 2001 to 74,0 % in 2015.  
Thus, Germany reaches place 7 of 43 countries, which exhausts well the 
employment potential. 
The lowest unemployment across countries is achieved in Norway, Switzerland 
and South Korea; there is only about 3 % of the labour force unemployed. The 
highest unemployment rates according to the IMF in 2013 are to be found in 
Spain (27,0 %) and Greece (27,0 %), South Africa (25,7 %), Serbia (23,0 %) 
and Portugal (18,3 %). Unemployment thus is extremely high especially in the 
crisis countries of the South – particularly in Greece and Spain, but also in 
Portugal. In Germany the economic integration into the labour market has 
improved, according to the IMF 2013 from 11,2 % in 2005 via 7,6 % in 2008 to 
5,7 % in 2013. Thus Germany ranks on place 9 of 42 countries.  
The economic integration is by far best achieved in the affluent Switzerland and 
in the social democratic Norway. Meanwhile Germany, too, scores well with 
place 6. On the other hand, the South European crisis countries Greece and 
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Spain, the post-socialist countries Serbia and Croatia as well as South Africa 
range at the very end in the economic integration. 
On the level of personal interaction in the tripartite coordinated Slovenia in 2012 
it is most likely to receive support by family or friends when one is mildly 
depressed, which is expected by 98 % of respondents in Slovenia, according to 
EQLS. In addition to the other post-socialist country Poland the familistic 
Greece also performs well. – In the city-state of Luxembourg, according to the 
theory of Durkheim more anomy can be expected. According to the survey 
Luxembourg has also only weak support networks. The same applies to the 
other conservative countries France and the Netherlands as well as for Cyprus. – 
In Germany about 94 % expect support from family or friends in the case of a 
depressive state according to EQLS 2012. Consequently, Germany ranks on 
place 11 out of 27 countries. 
Similarly, Gallup realises a regular survey in 140 countries, in which, inter alia, 
it is determined whether in case of problems one has relatives or friends, on 
whom one can count. Since the data of Gallup fluctuates relatively strongly with 
the annual samples we have robustified the latest data (2011-2014) by 
averaging. According to Gallup Ireland ranks at the top, because 97 % of 
respondents, according to their assessment count on the support of relatives or 
friends in the event of problems. – On the other hand, in India the support in 
case of problems is particularly low. Also in Croatia, Romania and in Turkey 
support in case of problems is weak. – In Germany 94% of respondents expect 
the support of relatives or friends in the case of problems according to Gallup. 
With place 9 Germany performs decently. 
The personal integration through support networks is best achieved in tripartite 
coordinated Slovenia according to the sub-index, as well as in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries New Zealand and Australia, in Switzerland and in social democratic 
Norway. With place 11 Germany belongs to the first third. In India one can 
count by far the least on help in case of problems according to Gallup. 
The participation in civil society is firstly partially characterised by the 
percentage of respondents who attended a meeting of a trade union, a political 
party or a citizens’ initiative last year. In the social democratic countries Sweden 
and Denmark 20,4 % and 18,2 %participate in this sense in civil society, 
according to EQLS 2012, this means that the two countries clearly rank at the 
top. – On the other hand, in Hungary, which is in a political crisis, only about 
2 % take part in such an activity. In Greece and Portugal, which are in deep 
economic crises, only about 3 % or about 4 % participate in such political 
activities. – In Germany 7,6 % of the respondents take part at least once in a 
political event (including community groups and trade unions). Thus, Germany 
ranks on place 13 out of 30 countries.  
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The civic participation can be secondly partially characterised by the percentage 
of respondents who in the past month voiced their opinion against a public 
official (see Gallup). Since these data from Gallup fluctuate relatively strongly 
with the annual samples we have robustified the actual data (2012-14) by 
averaging in order to achieve a more stable data base. This participation is 
especially strong in the social democratic countries Denmark (40 %), Sweden 
(30 %) and Norway (30 %) as well as in the conservative countries Austria 
(33 %) and Germany (31 %) according to Gallup. – This participation is least in 
China (6 %), Turkey (8 %) and in ten of the thirteen post-socialist countries. – In 
Germany currently about 31 % of respondents per month voice their opinion to a 
public official, according to Gallup. With place 3 Germany has improved and 
now belongs to the top group among the 43 countries considered. 
In the European survey EQLS it is similarly asked how large a proportion of the 
population has contacted a politician or public official. According to this survey 
contacting a politician is most common in the social democratic countries 
Norway, Sweden and Denmark as well as in the conservative countries 
Luxembourg and Austria. In all twelve post-socialist countries of the survey this 
political participation is rather low. With place 9 in this political participation 
Germany now belongs to the upper midfield of the 31 countries of the survey. 
If one calculates the sub-index “Contacting politicians” out of the partial 
indicators of Gallup and EQLS with the same weight, so especially the social 
democratic countries Norway, Denmark and Sweden as well as the conservative 
countries Luxembourg, Austria and Germany rank at the top. In all thirteen post-
socialist countries this political participation ranges below the international 
average. 
If one thirdly determines the civil society partially by the union membership, so 
the social democratic countries Finland (69,0 %), Sweden (67,3 %) and 
Denmark (66,8 %) rank at the top, according to the OECD. – The lowest union 
density on the other hand can be found in Estonia (5,7 %), Turkey (6,3 %), 
France (7,7 %), Lithuania (10,0 %) and South Korea (10,1 % ). – In Germany 
there are 18,1 % union members, according to the OECD. Thus, Germany ranks 
on place 21 among 37 countries. 
The integration in civil society according to the summarising sub-index is most 
developed in the social democratic countries Sweden, Denmark and Norway. 
With place 13 Germany belongs to the first third of the countries. The 
participation in civil society is particularly low in the majority of post-socialist 
countries, and especially in China, where on the one hand, the economic 
integration is well pronounced, but the participation of citizens is still very 
weakly developed. 
If one now forms an overall index out of the standardised sub-indices with equal 
weight of the three dimensions of social integration – economic integration, 
personal integration and integration in the civil society – the social democratic 
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countries Norway, Denmark and Sweden achieve the best index values. In these 
social democratic countries in particular the participation in civil society is very 
well developed. Meanwhile, with place 6 Germany performs relatively well, too. 
At the end of the ranking one finds Greece, a country in crisis, and Serbia as 
well as at the very end India, which is only quantitatively the largest democracy. 
 
On the development of the employment rates  
There is a long-term trend to increasing employment rates, particularly because 
of rising female participation. In the OECD the overall employment rate rose 
from 65,5 % in 2000 to 66,6 % in 2008, fell during the crisis year 2009 back to 
64,8 % and recovered to 65,8 % in 2014. The employment rate of women 
increased from 55,0 % in 2000 to 58,0 % in 2014, while the employment rate of 
men decreased from 76,1 % in 2000 to 73,3 % in 2014. 
According to the data of the OECD the employment rate of the social 
democratic welfare regime ranks continuously at the top, whereat Sweden 
overtook Denmark in about 2014. The employment rate of the conservative 
welfare regime ranks stably behind on a high level, with Switzerland 
permanently at the forefront. The economically liberal welfare regime has a 
similarly high level of employment as the conservative, but was more affected 
by the economic crisis (this is especially true for Ireland), from which it has, 
however, recovered by now. The productivist welfare regime recorded a 
relatively continuous increase in the employment rate. The productivist welfare 
regime recorded a relatively continuous increase in the employment rate. The 
group of post-socialist countries has suffered an even sharper decline of 
employment in 2009/10, from which, however, it has recovered by now. In the 
familistic welfare regime the decline of the employment rate in the economic 
crises continues until 2013 and is recovering only slowly since then. This is 
especially true for Greece.  
 
On the development of the unemployment rates  
Of the economic crises resulting from the financial crises, the familistic welfare 
regime is the most affected, since economic growth has slowed down due to the 
weak competitiveness and unemployment has risen sharply. During the crisis, 
the competitiveness of Greece proved to be the weakest. But also Spain, 
Portugal, Italy and with a time delay Cyprus were hit hard by the economic 
crises (because of its involvement in Greek banks). In Portugal unemployment 
rose from 7,7 % in 2006 to 9,4 % in the crisis year of the global financial crisis 
in 2009, with the euro crisis unemployment rose to 16,2 % in 2013, but fell to 
11,2 % by 2016. In Italy unemployment rose from 6,8 % in 2006 via 7,7 % in 
the crisis year 2009 to 12,6 % in 2014 because of the euro crisis and then 
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decreased to 11,5 % by 2016. Cyprus fell into the crisis only with the banking 
crisis in Greece because of its involvement in these banks. After low 4,5 % in 
2006, unemployment reached its peak at 16,2 % in 2014, but fell to 13,0 % by 
2016. In Spain, unemployment rose from 8,5 % in 2006 to 17,9 % in the crisis 
year 2009, reaching its peak at 26,1 % in 2013 with the euro crisis, and then 
declined slightly to 19,4 % in 2016. Greece proved as the weakest link in the 
Eurogroup in the challenges of the two financial crises because of its low 
competitiveness. Unemployment rose from 7,8 % in 2008 to 9,6 % in the crisis 
year 2009 and, with the euro crisis, to 27,5 % in 2013 and then declined slightly 
to 23,3 % in 2016. Malta, on the other hand, remained untroubled by the crises 
with the help of low real taxation, its unemployment rate fell from 6,8 % in 2006 
to 4,8 % in 2016. The post-socialist welfare regime was hit as the second-
strongest by the crisis, whereat the Baltic States with its credit-financed growth 
model crashed the hardest in the crisis year 2009, but from which they have 
recovered by now.  
In Japan as the representative of the most successful welfare regime, the 
productivist one, the unemployment rate rose from 4,1 % in 2006 to 5,1 % in the 
crisis year 2009, but was reduced to about 3,2 % by 2016. – In Germany, the 
unemployment rate rose from 7,4 % in 2008 to only 7,7 % in the crisis year 
2009, since the government intervened among others with short-time working 
regulations and economic stimulus packages. By October 2016 the 
unemployment rate had been reduced to low 4,3 %, according to the 
measurement of the IMF. 
 
On the development of the social support networks according to EQLS 
There is a general trend of declining support networks during the period of the 
world financial crisis and the subsequent economic crises. This also holds true 
for all welfare regimes. 
If one feels a little depressed (so the indicator of social support networks), one 
can expect on average most likely support from one’s networks in post-socialist 
countries (see the data of the EQLS for 2003, 2007 and 2011/12). While civic 
engagement is especially weak in post-socialist countries, the personal niches on 
the other hand, are rather well developed. Within the post-socialist group of 
countries Slovenia with its model of social partners always ranks at the top. On 
the other hand, the social support networks have further decreased in the 
economically liberal countries Estonia and Latvia during the crisis and are 
weakest in the context of post-socialist countries.  
The familistic welfare regime with its extended families as potential support 
networks ranks on place 2, wherein Cyprus, however, significantly drops during 
the economic crisis. 
The social democratic welfare regime ranks on place 3 in the strength of support 
networks, but has weakened significantly during the economic crisis. 
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Comparatively poorly developed are the support networks in the conservative 
welfare regime, even further weakening during the economic crisis. They are 
particularly weak in France and in the Netherlands according to the EQLS. 
Similarly poorly developed as in the conservative welfare regimes are the 
support networks in the economically liberal countries UK and Ireland, where 
the social support networks weakened even further during the economic crisis. 
 
On the development of social support networks according to Gallup  
Also according to the data of Gallup the personal support decreases during the 
period of the world financial crisis and the economic crises. The data fluctuate, 
however, relatively strongly with the annual samples. If one robustifies the 
actual data (2011-14) by averaging, then the level and the course of personal 
support are more advantageous in the social democratic, the economically 
liberal and in the conservative welfare regime than in the familistic, in the post-
socialist and in the productivist welfare regime. However, the data fluctuate with 
the annual samples. 
 
On the development of the participation in political events  
From 2003 to 2012 the participation in political events has generally declined, 
according to EQLS. In the social democratic welfare regime, which is at the 
forefront, participation in political events fell from 27 % to 19 %. With clear 
distance the conservative welfare regime follows, where the participation fell 
from 14 % to 9 %, then the economically liberal welfare regime with a decrease 
from 13 % to 8 %, the familistic welfare regime with a decrease from 14 % to 
7 % and the post-socialist group with a decline from 8 % to 6 %. The challenges 
during the time of the world financial crisis have thus led to a decline in 
participation in political events. 
 
On the development of contacting politicians  
According to the data of Gallup contacting politicians is most pronounced and 
stable in time in the social democratic welfare regime where Denmark is always 
at the top. The course of the conservative welfare regime ranks behind, followed 
by the economically liberal welfare regime, wherein contacting politicians is 
particularly widespread in the United States. The familistic welfare regime is on 
place 4 in this form of political participation and has improved since 2006, 
which holds particularly true for Portugal and Spain. The productivist welfare 
regime has fallen behind the familistic one. The post-socialist group ranks at the 
end and stagnates in this form of political participation. 
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Also according to the EQLS surveys from 2003, 2007 and 2012 the social 
democratic welfare regime is always at the top considering contacting 
politicians, followed by the conservative and the economically liberal welfare 
regime. The familistic welfare regime and the post-socialist group range over 
time in each case at the end. The overall improvement in 2013 – together with 
the economic recovery – can only be seen in the more recent data of Gallup.  
 
On the development of union membership  
According to OECD 2016 union density has fallen in the OECD countries from 
20,2 % in 2000 to 18,0 % in 2008, slightly increased in the year of crisis 2009 to 
18,1 %, but fell back to 16,7 % in 2014. Hence there is rather a trend to 
declining participation in the trade unions, which was only temporarily 
interrupted during the crisis. 
In the social democratic welfare regime union density declined from 67,0 % in 
2006 to 63,8 % in 2014, according to OECD 2016. During this period Sweden 
fell behind Finland. In the conservative welfare regime union density decreased 
from the much lower level of 27,7 % in 2006 to 25,0 % in 2014. In the 
economically liberal welfare regime union density fell from 23,5 % in 2006 to 
20,6 % in 2014, whereat in Ireland an increase could be observed during the 
financial crisis, which was more than offset by a following decline, though. In 
the familistic welfare regime an increase in union density occurred in Italy and 
Spain between 2006 and 2014, where during the crisis citizens strengthened 
their participation in the political process. In the post-socialist group of countries 
union density fell from 18,6 % in 2006 to 12,7 % in 2014. The decline was 
particularly marked in Slovenia, Hungary and Estonia, which had to cope with 
various crises. 
Altogether, the participation in civil society is more pronounced in the social 
democratic countries and relatively low in the post-socialist countries and the 
productivist welfare regime. 
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9. Comparison of living conditions:  
The performance of the countries and welfare regimes 
 
9.1 Performance profiles of the welfare regimes 
Since targets such as growth (e.g. mountains of consumption) and ecological 
sustainability (e.g. garbage dumps) can conflict, the goals are presented in a star 
diagram, with the goals pointing outwards.9 For the recognition of peculiarities, 
friendliness towards women is chosen for the graphic, since the data base is 
more complete and better than for the friendliness towards migrants. 
With regard to this conceptual figure, the social-democratic welfare regime of 
Scandinavia is currently almost everywhere at the outside in Figure 13-1. Seven 
of the nine criteria are on average best met by the social-democratic countries, 
so that achieving all these - partially conflicting - goals is quite possible. With 
the highest public and the second highest private expenditures for research and 
development, the social-democratic welfare regime ranks on top in terms of 
internet use, on 3rd place with regard to patents and altogether on second place 
in the overall index of innovation capacity. With regard to economic prosperity, 
the social-democratic welfare regime ranks by now in front of the economically 
liberal and the conservative welfare regime. The high level of prosperity has the 
downside of an increased ecologically stress level. But especially with regard to 
renewable energy and the relief efforts as a whole, the social-democratic  
welfare regime is so far ahead that it ranks also at the top in the overall index of 
ecological sustainability. That is, high prosperity and ecological sustainability 
are partly conflicting, but they are not incompatible. - The social-democratic 
welfare regime is the best choice for the provision of social security benefits in 
the case of risk and for prevention through education as well as for social 
protection altogether. Due to the highest total investments in precaution and 
aftercare, the social-democratic welfare regime achieves the lowest income 
poverty risk and the most egalitarian distribution of income as well as the 
leading place in the overall index for the equality of participation. Through these 
investments, the welfare regime also favors the highest satisfaction of the 
population with the freedom of choice and the best objective capability of the 
population for autonomy and thus also the first place in the objective and 
subjective autonomy as a whole. - The social-democratic welfare regime ranks 
at the top with regards to the proportion of women in parliament, the proportion 
of female students, the female employment rate and the female income ratio, as 
well as the overall index of friendliness towards women. 
                                                 
9
   The indicators, subindices and indices are each standardized to make them more comparable. (Hence, the 
mean value is 0, the variance (or the standard deviation) respectively 1.) Negative means: below the average. 
Positive: above average. For all criteria, I also report the standardized versions so that size orders are 
measured independently of the topic in the same "step length". 
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With regard to personal integration and to integration in the civil society, as well 
as in the overall index of social inclusion, the social-democratic welfare regime 
always ranks at the top, although this is primarily the case for the indigenous 
population and less for migrants. 
The socio-democratic welfare regime ranges at the end with regard to the  
participation of migrants in the educational system and in the labour market, and 
this is also the case for the overall index of friendliness towards migrants. This 
is a weak point of the social-democratic welfare regime, which was ethnically 
and culturally relatively  homogeneous and has few experiences with migrants.  
The conservative welfare regime of continental Europe ranks third among the 
welfare regimes in terms of innovation, and this also applies to the prosperity 
achieved (the city state of Luxembourg as an outlier is not taken into account). 
The social democratic, the economically liberal and the conservative welfare 
regime exhibit a similar level of prosperity, these are the three prosperous 
welfare regimes. As a downside to high prosperity, the conservative welfare 
regime ranges at the penultimate place in terms of ecological burden. With 
respect to relief efforts, however, it achieves the 3rd place and in the overall 
index of ecological sustainability the 4th place of the 6 welfare regimes. – While 
the conservative welfare regime is second to the social-democratic welfare 
regime in the aftercare expenditures of the welfare sector, it ranges only on third
place in the preventive public and private educational expenditures. The 2nd 
place in social protection as a whole is the basis for the second place in the case 
of income poverty, of income inequality and in the overall index for equality of 
participation. In the case of objective capability for autonomy, the conservative 
welfare regime reaches the 4th place, and in the case of subjective autonomy the 
third place, the latter also applies to the overall index of autonomy. – Like the 
4th place in the female income ratio, the conservative welfare regime also 
reaches the 4th place in the overall index of women-friendliness. In the case of 
integration in the civil society, the conservative welfare regime is second, and 
third in the overall index of social integration. However, social integration is 
more successful for the native population. In terms of openness to migration, the 
prosperous conservative welfare regime is still in the second place behind the 
economically liberal welfare regime, but it only ranks fourth in terms of the 
participation of migrants in the educational system and on the labour market. 
The latter also applies to the overall index of migrant-friendliness.  
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While the economically liberal Anglo-Saxon welfare regime occupies 4th place 
in all indicators of innovation capacity and also in the overall index, it is a little 
behind the social-democratic, and roughly the same, with the conservative 
welfare regime in the 2nd place. This is particularly the case in the USA, which 
is transforming its world power status and its monetary policy into a high 
average prosperity. As a downside to high prosperity, the economic welfare 
regime has the highest environmental impact level and is also at the penultimate 
place in the relief efforts. Priority is given to prosperity and economic growth, 
neglecting environmental sustainability (last place in the overall index). While 
the economically liberal welfare regime occupies 4th place in all indicators of 
innovation capacity and also in the overall index, in the standard of living it 
ranks a little behind the social-democratic and a little before the conservative 
welfare regime on the 2nd place. This is particularly caused by the USA, which 
is transforming its world power status and its currency privilege into a high 
average prosperity. As a downside to high prosperity, the economically liberal 
welfare regime has the highest environmental burden and ranges also at the 
penultimate point with respect to the relief efforts. Priority is given to prosperity 
and economic growth, neglecting environmental sustainability (last place in the 
overall index). – While the economically liberal welfare regime is part of the 
lower half with respect to the expenditures of the welfare state, it reaches the 
second place behind the social-democratic welfare regime in terms of public and 
private educational expenditures. As a result, the economically liberal welfare 
regime is also on second place in terms of low educational poverty. On the other 
hand, the income poverty is the second highest and the inequality of the income 
distribution is the highest among all welfare regimes, since the state interferes as 
little as possible in the markets in accordance with the economically liberal 
philosophy. The second place in terms of investments in education pays off in 
the 2nd place for the objective capabilities on the basis of the educational  
system. According to Gallup (2016), the subjective satisfaction of the population 
with the freedom of choice ranks also on second place. In this way, the 
economically liberal welfare regime also reaches the second place in the overall 
index of subjective and objective autonomy, a good result on the basis of 
prosperity and educational investments. – Women's employment rate and 
women's income quotient of the economically liberal welfare regime rank each 
on the second place behind the social-democratic welfare regime, but the 
representation of women in parliament ranges only on the 4th place. Both in 
terms of openness to migrants as well as in the participation of migrants in the 
educational system and on the labour market, the economically liberal welfare 
regime ranks at the top, and the traditional immigrant countries also reach the 
first place with regard to the overall index of migrant-friendliness, since by 
learning processes and experiences they have developed the best way to deal 
with migrants. The economically liberal welfare regime is second in the 
employment rate and also in terms of personal integration, behind the social-
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democratic welfare regime, and it is also on second place behind the social-
democratic welfare regime with respect to the overall index of social integration. 
The familistic welfare regime of Southern Europe ranges at the end in both 
public and private investments in research and development. This also applies to 
the dissemination of Internet use and to the overall index of innovation capacity. 
In the standard of living, this welfare regime ranges with the penultimate place 
somewhat better than Eastern Europe, as the tourism contributes to the 
prosperity of the Southern countries. With respect to the ecological burden by 
the CO2-emissions and the nuclear energy risk technology, Southern Europe is 
the best. The relief efforts are on second place, so that the familistic welfare 
regime reaches the second place behind the social-democratic welfare regime 
with respect to the overall index of ecological sustainability. – In terms of public 
and private educational expenditures as precaution, the familistic welfare regime 
ranges fourth. In the expenditures of the welfare state, the familistic welfare 
regime ranks on the third place, although the expenditures are too much directed 
to the insiders of the labour market and to pensions. The familistic welfare 
regime also ranks 3rd with respect to the overall index of social security. The 
familistic welfare regime ranges 4th in terms of high income poverty and great 
inequality in the income distribution. In terms of "risk-readers" in the sense of 
PISA and with respect to educational poverty, the familistic welfare regime 
ranges at the very end, the educational system is very little successful. That is 
why the familistic welfare regime of Southern Europe ranges also at the end 
with respect to the overall index for the equality of participation. In terms of 
objective capability for autonomy (inter alia by reading competencies), Southern 
Europe ranges on penultimate place. The satisfaction with the freedom of choice 
is somewhat higher than in the post-socialist group of countries. In the overall 
index for objective and subjective autonomy, the familistic welfare regime 
ranges then also on the penultimate position, followed by the post-socialist   
group of countries at the very end. – Due to the great influence of the Churches 
in Southern Europe, gender roles are still relatively traditional. In the women's 
employment rate and in the female income ratio as well as in the overall index 
of womenfriendliness, the familistic welfare regime ranges on the penultimate 
position, followed only by the productivist welfare regime of East Asia. In terms 
of openness to migration, the familistic welfare regime ranges on the 4th place, 
but on second place with regard to migrants' participation; and this also applies 
to the overall index of migrant-friendliness. The traditional countries in 
Southern Europe range at the end in terms of the employment rate; this also 
applies to the unemployment rate of the relatively less competitive countries of 
Southern Europe after the global financial crisis. In terms of integration in the 
civil society, with the fourth place the South is better off than in economic 
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integration, but the familistic welfare regime nevertheless ranks at the end with 
respect to the overall index of social integration. 
Since the enterprises in the productivist welfare regime of East Asia invest 
comparatively by far the most in research and development, it ranks also at the 
top in the overall expenditures. Because of the productivist concept of economic 
advancement through competitiveness on the world market, the productivist 
welfare regime is also at the forefront of important patents aimed at 
safeguarding technological developments against its competitors. Hence, the 
productivist welfare regime is also at the forefront with respect to the overall 
index of innovation capacity (before the social-democratic welfare regime). But 
in prosperity it is still behind the three wealthy welfare regimes, the social-
democratic, the economically liberal and the conservative. However, the growth 
rate is higher in the productivist welfare regime.  
The two productivist countries already belong to the 18 countries with the 
highest prosperity. In terms of environmental burden, the productivist welfare 
regime ranges in the middle, because e. g. the amount of garbage is significantly 
lower than in the more prosperous economically liberal welfare regime. But in 
relief efforts the productivist welfare regime ranges even behind the 
economically liberal welfare regime at the very end, since the ecological 
sustainability has been neglected due to the one-sided focus on economic 
growth. – In the priorities between precaution and after care in social security, 
the productivist welfare regime places greater emphasis on public and private 
investments in education as a precautionary measure, but in the case of the 
expenditures of the welfare state it is by far on last place, since the protection in 
case of risk is left to the families. The performances with respect to the equality 
of participation in terms of education and income are corresponding. 
While the productivist welfare regime is at the forefront in terms of  few "risk-
readers" in the sense of PISA and with little educational poverty, it ranges at the 
very end in terms of high income poverty, since the protection is left to the 
families. In the objective capability of the population to autonomy through the 
education system, the productivist welfare regime is at the forefront in terms of   
average reading competency as well as in the amount of top readers. This good 
result is, however, relativized by the subjective assessment of the population, 
whose satisfaction with the freedom of choice is only ranked fourth. In terms of 
objective and subjective autonomy as a whole, the productivist welfare regime is 
then on the fourth place behind the three prosperous welfare regimes. – The 
gender roles in the productivist welfare regime of East Asia are still very 
traditional, hence the proportion of women in the parliament as well as the 
proportion of female students, the female employment rate and the female 
income ratio range at the very end, which of course also applies to the overall 
index of womenfriendliness. Since the countries of the productivist welfare 
regime of East Asia are still strongly nationally oriented, there are only about
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2 % migrants. Further information on the participation of migrants is not 
available in the usual surveys. According to this few information, the 
productivist welfare regime of East Asia ranges on the last place in terms of 
migrant- friendliness. According to the productivist welfare logic, integration 
into the labour market is comparatively best achieved in the productivist welfare 
regime. The employment rate ranges only on 4th place because of the traditional 
gender roles. In the case of personal integration and integration in the civil 
society, it ranges at the end. Because of the good economic integration, the 
productivist welfare regime ranges fourth with respect to the overall index of 
social integration, but it is largely the social integration of the natives, since 
there are only few migrants.  
In private as well as in public investments in research and development, the 
post-socialist group of countries in Eastern Europe ranges in the penultimate 
position before the familistic welfare regime. This also applies to the 
dissemination of Internet use and to the overall index of innovation capacity. In 
the case of average prosperity, this country group ranges at the very end, with 
the Czech Republic and Slovenia already catching up to the midfield. On the 
other hand, this group of countries has a low level of garbage and the second 
lowest environmental burden. In the use of energy, e. g. the raw material rich 
Russia is little efficient. In the relief efforts altogether, the country group is on 
fourth place, hence it reaches only the third place in the overall index of 
ecological sustainability. – In the expenditures of the welfare state, the post-
socialist group of countries ranges on the penultimate position, followed only by 
the productivist welfare regime of East Asia. In the case of public and private 
educational expenditures as precaution, this group of countries ranges even at 
the very end, and this also applies to the overall index of social security. 
Altogether, this group of countries has rather turned away from the model of 
governmental provision. In terms of the proportion of "risk-readers" as defined 
by PISA, this group of countries ranges on the penultimate position (before 
Southern Europe), and this also applies to total educational poverty. In terms of 
income poverty and in the inequality of the income distribution, this country 
group scores slightly better with the 3rd resp. 4th place, but this country group 
ranges on the penultimate position (before Southern Europe) with respect to the 
overall index of equality of participation. In terms of objective capability of the 
population to autonomy through the education system, the post-socialist group 
of countries ranges at the very end. This also applies to the satisfaction of the 
population with the freedom of choice as well as finally to the overall index of 
subjective and objective autonomy. – The post-socialist group of countries 
belongs to the top in terms of the share of female students, but in the 
representation of women in parliament it ranges only on the penultimate position 
(before East Asia). In the case of women's income quotient, this country group is 
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on third place, and this also applies to the overall index of womenfriendliness. 
Because of the relatively low prosperity, this group of countries exhibits only a 
small number of migrants, only East Asia has less migrants. But in the 
participation of the (few) migrants, this group of countries is on third place; this 
also applies to the overall index of migrant-friendliness. In economic 
integration, the post-socialist group of countries ranges on the penultimate 
position (before the economic crisis countries of the South). In terms of 
integration in the civil society, this group of countries ranges at the very end; 
and this also applies to the overall index of social integration. In the post-
socialist societies, civil society has not yet developed long enough.. 
 
 
9.2 A system of societal monitoring of the wealth and welfare of nations 
I think that the approach of welfare regimes, in which the logic of the production 
and distribution of welfare is examined, is particularly suited to explain the 
welfare of the nations in part. On the other hand, the individual countries, at the 
same time, show differences and independent profiles with respect to the 
socially desirable goals and the quality of the living conditions in the analyzed 
dimensions. 
The best reform program would be to organize social development as a learning 
process. In expansion respectively systematization of the Human Development 
Report of the United Nations, which takes into account as many nations as 
possible, but is in part limited to relatively crude indicators, the comparison of 
the welfare of nations should be extended to such a broad list of socially 
desirable goals and quality criteria, as I have suggested here for a system of 
continuous societal observation, which should, of course, be further developed 
in a learning process itself. 
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